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The master thesis focuses on the examination of the framework ideas on meaning making in 
Vygotsky’s holistic theory of child’s development and the analysis of the evolution of these 
ideas within the cognitivist and the social constructivist approaches. The thesis embarks on the 
understanding of how later research converges with Vygotsky’s ideas, how Vygotsky’s original 
ideas can be clarified, explained and operationalized with the help of the cognitivist and the 
social constructivist approaches and whether this new knowledge can serve the basis for 
development and application of meaning making in special needs pedagogy. 
The thesis is a theoretical study - a systematic review of relevant literature on a selected topic. 
The relevant literature on the topic of meaning making for the purposes of the present thesis 
encompasses Vygotsky’s original works inter alia in Russian, Lakoff and Johnson’s study of 
cognitive metaphor within the cognitivist approach to meaning making and Bruner’s research 
on folk psychology and narrative within the social constructivist approach. A theoretical study 
of the topic seems appropriate because a fragmented use of meaning making in pedagogy does 
not allow a comprehensive empirical study. Besides, a theoretical thesis permits a statement of 
open questions allowing exploring the topic from different perspectives. 
Findings indicate that, firstly, there are a few framework ideas in Vygotsky’s theory that are 
important for the application of meaning making in special needs pedagogy. Inter alia, these 
are the following ideas: the changing relations between mental functions in child psychological 
systems, verbal thinking, private speech and inner speech, instrumentalism, appearance of 
everyday (spontaneous) concepts, the role of imitative modelling and personal mental-
emotional experience in child’s meaning making within the zone of proximal development. 
Secondly, Vygotsky’s ideas on meaning making are sustained, explained and operationalized 
in Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphorical thinking and cognitive metaphors and in 
Bruner’s theory of folk psychology and narrative structuring of reality. The three theories 
converge in the main point: language, thinking and socially meaningful activity are strongly 
interconnected in child’s meaning making. Thirdly, Lakoff and Johnson’s and Bruner’s theories 
provide special needs pedagogues with the knowledge of how cognitive metaphors (e.g. in 
psychoeducation) and folk theories and narratives (e.g. in the form of social stories with autistic 
children) can contribute to adjusting child’s meaning making for the purposes of the future lives 
of children with developmental peculiarities.   
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Chapter 1. Setting the scene  
1.1. The project’s background  
Humans are meaning seeking beings and all their actions are acts of meaning, including speech 
acts (Bruner, 1990, p.33). It is natural for people to make understanding and create meanings 
of the outer realities and acquire awareness of one’s place in the changing world, otherwise the 
outer world is perceived as a chaotic place not suitable or safe for survival (Bruner, 1990, p.56). 
People make meaning of the outer realities through cognitive patterns typical of all human 
brains (Vygotsky, 1982, p.375; Gee, 1999, p.52), and through systems of cultural values and 
social attitudes typical of the societies where their personalities have been developing 
(Vygotsky, 1982; Vygotsky, 1934/2012; Bruner, 1990, p.34; Gee, 1999, p.52). Language is an 
indispensable part of meaning making (Vygotsky, 1934/2012). Language is both a cognitive 
mechanism and a storage-system of socio-cultural and personal values (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). The language of an individual reflects the individual’s picture 
of the world, and at the same time creates prerequisites for a life scenario. According to Bruner, 
Wittgenstein observed once: “Limits of our language create boundaries for our actions”1 (as 
cited in Bruner, 1990).  
In the course of developing cognitive functions, acquiring language, social skills and new 
experiences, children develop certain ‘frames’/‘schemes’ for understanding the world around 
them. These frames are, in a way, patterns of different life situations. These patterns help to 
sort out, categorize and conceptualize new information and circumstances, i.e. to make meaning 
of new situations. If something unusual or unexpected happens and the meaning becomes 
unclear, the meaning-making process is triggered again (Schultz & Lien, 2013). Schultz, 
Langballe, & Raundalen (2014) observe that particularly the inability to comprehend and to 
make sense of the world around causes children the loss of safety and leads to personal crises. 
It is reasonable to argue that the knowledge about meaning making acquires special significance 
for all who work with children.  
Language and thinking are claimed to be crucial in meaning making (Vygotsky, 1934/2012; 
Bruner, 2004; Lakoff 1987). For a long time, these systems have been studied separately in 
different fields of knowledge. Language as a semiotic system, once claimed by Ferdinand de 
Saussure, has been studied by linguists from different perspectives. Thinking at large and the 
human brain have been studied by neuroscientists – neurobiologists and psychologists. Lev 
Semionovitch Vygotsky was one of the first who proclaimed the indispensability of neuro-
                                                 
1 Sometimes translated as “the limits of language are the limits of my thought” (Weismann, 1979). 
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cognitive, linguistic and cultural-historic traits in child’s development (Vygotsky, 1934/2012).  
He emphasized the role of pedagogy and formal schooling for the formation of child’s 
conceptual systems and personality in social-cultural contexts (Vygotsky, 1934/2012). 
Subsequent research provides examples of the significance of meaning making in educational 
contexts (Petrie & Oshlag, 1993; Schultz & Lien, 2013; Skarstein, 2013; Bruner, 1966; Bruner, 
1996; Woods, Bruner, & Ross, 1976).  
Vygotsky’s research has vividly shown that meaning making is crucial for special needs 
pedagogy (Vygotsky, 1983; Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.135, p.265). If a child’s cognitive, 
perceptual, sensory etc. systems are impaired or deviate in some way, meaning making patterns 
may differ at the outset from those of other children. The heterogeneity of physical, psychical, 
psychological, neurobiological and other peculiarities does not fit any specific guidelines or 
standard procedures. However, there may be traced some common features of meaning making 
processes characteristic of all human minds.  What seems to be necessary to do with the purpose 
to implement meaning making in special needs pedagogy is to internalize the existing 
knowledge from other fields, to understand the pragmatic value of meaning making for children 
with special needs, and to developing a method of implementation of meaning making in special 
needs pedagogy.  
1.2. What is meaning making? – the point of departure 
 
An individual’s mind and thinking are pattern-organized (Vygotsky, 1982, p.375). Our former 
experiences are stored in cognitive patterns whose nature and structures are not yet fully studied 
(Gee, 1999, p.52). Language participates actively in the formation of these structures 
(Vygotsky, 1982, p.415). Every new life situation may become confusing because it does not 
necessarily fit into existing pattern-organized thinking of an individual. The confusion triggers 
a meaning making process. It starts with interpretation of a new situation in terms of existing 
conceptual frames (Fillmore, 2006), or rather through prototypical categorization (Rosch, 
1983). An important aspect of meaning making is identification of oneself and the voluntary 
act to make meaning of these new circumstances (Frankl, 1992; Vygotsky 1934/2012, p.348, 
Bruner, 1990, p.100). The existing cognitive frames are reshaped, or a new frame arises only if 
it makes sense for this person (Frankl, 1992; Antonovsky, 1987). One can hypothesize that 
individual temperamental traits, one’s emotional state, one’s motivation, neurobiological 
characteristics of the brain, value or moral systems, and acquired social-cultural experiences 
can impact meaning making, each to a certain extent. Awareness of one’s changed self in a new 
setting (which is maturing from the pedagogical perspective) contributes to realization of 
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manageability of a new situation and increases motivation (Antonovsky, 1987).  If meaning is 
not ascribed to or deduced from a new situation, meaning making fails and it may lead to 
undesirable consequences: stress, trauma, suicide, socially dangerous behaviour, or can trigger 
psychoses, psychosomatic processes etc. (Hobfoll et.al., 2009). 
The core component of meaning making is meaning. Depending on the field of knowledge 
meaning is understood differently. It is an objective in itself to present the overview of all the 
known definitions of meaning. For the purposes of this thesis I have derived the following 
understanding of meaning: it is a concept (conceptual frame or cognitive pattern) bound by a 
sign (word).   
Meaning making gives us a framework for mapping, categorizing and conceptualizing of the 
outer world and relating our experiences in the outer world to linguistic representations. 
Meaning making theories explain how human brain understands and processes impressions and 
knowledge about the outer world and the humans’ role and place in it (Skarstein, 2015). 
Moreover, meaning making theories attempt to explain how new knowledge and experiences 
impact on our way of thinking about the outer world (Bruner, 1986; Lakoff, 1987; Skarstein, 
2015) and how language can contribute to finding solutions for challenges occurring under 
unknown circumstances (Bruner, 1990; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003).  
There exist two points of view on meaning making: cognitivist and social constructivist (e.g. 
Skarstein, 2013, p.35; Penne, 2006, pp.24-27). In case cognitive aspects of meaning making are 
taken into consideration, the main focus is placed on the cognitive strategies of conceptualizing 
the world, common for all human brains. The human brain is understood as predisposed to 
recognize and internalize new experiences in terms of a certain system of patterns or 
constructions.  
However, despite common predispositions, brain’s cognitive structures are further developed 
and modified in the process of growing and learning under a strong influence of the society and 
the culture in which a child develops. The latter socio-cultural aspect is pointed out by social 
constructivism. Social constructivism emphasizes the difference between similar cognitive 
patterns in different cultures which happens because of the different value coding of the same 
phenomena in various linguo-cultural communities.   
Having taken into consideration both views on meaning making, I suggest the following 
definition as a point of departure for the present thesis: meaning making is the process of 
internalizing experiences by way of creating or reshaping conceptual representations bound by 
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linguistic representations according to certain patterns under the influence of social-cultural 
settings. Having said this, I will now turn to the objective of the thesis and research questions. 
1.3. Objective and research questions  
 
The objective of the master thesis is to examine the genesis of the theory of meaning making 
in Vygotsky’s pedagogical-psychological theory of child’s development and to analyze the 
evolution of the meaning making theory within the cognitivist and the social constructivist 
approaches. This will provide a basis for a discussion of applicability of meaning making in 
special needs pedagogy.    
To achieve the objective it is necessary to resolve three intermediate research questions.  
Firstly, I must point out, describe and discuss relevant pillar concepts regarding meaning 
making in Vygotsky’s holistic theory of child’s cognitive, linguistic and social-cultural 
development.  
Secondly, I must analyse how Vygotsky’s original framework ideas can be understood and 
operationalized with the help of new research within the cognitivist and the social constructivist 
approaches to meaning making.  
Thirdly, I must clarify how these two approaches converge with Vygotsky’s ideas, how they 
contribute to the theory of meaning making and how new knowledge within them opens up for 
new perspectives in pedagogical contexts.  
When the research questions are answered in the corresponding chapters of the thesis and the 






Chapter 2. Method and methodological challenges 
In this chapter I will explain how I have dealt with the methodological challenges of literature 
search in a theoretical study. Since the choice of sources has profound consequences for the 
thesis’s outline, it will be necessary to shed light on how I have made an assessment of relevant 
sources in order to secure the necessary breadth, depth and accuracy of the theoretical research. 
I will also give an account of my background which have impacted on my interest to this topic. 
Further, I will explain how I have worked with the Russian sources and, in particular, 
translations of Vygotsky’s texts. Then, I will briefly summarize the main postulates of the 
cognitivist and the social constructivist approaches and explain why I consider Lakoff and 
Johnson’s theory of cognitive metaphor and Bruner’s theory of the narrative construction of the 
reality as relevant for my research.  I will also clarify why it has become useful to refer to some 
empirical data collected by me in my practice and during my internship period at Statped – 
Nord.  
2.1. Theoretical study  
A theoretical study is primarily a systematic critical review of relevant literature on a selected 
topic. It consists in a summary of the chosen sources with their discussion (Hart, 1998). I have 
embarked on a theoretical study of the topic of meaning making because despite of its 
originality and usefulness, its use in the fields of knowledge with respect to child development 
seems rather fragmented. Without clearly formulated postulates of the theory and justification 
of its relevance for the chosen field, its effective application will be problematic. Meaning 
making applies in special needs pedagogy sporadically and unsystematically, thus, empirical 
research does not seem feasible.  A theoretical study seems appropriate because it allows a 
statement of open questions permitting mapping of the field and exploring the topic from the 
outset. Besides, it gives an opportunity to immerse oneself in large quantities of relevant 
literature in a relatively short time (Hart, 1998, p.26). Generally speaking, a theoretical study 
gives researchers the opportunity to examine how previous research has contributed to the field. 
“The knowledge pool” forms the basis for new research questions and allows to identify gaps 
in previous research (Hart, 1998, p.27).  
Inspired by the previous research on meaning making in an educational context (Schultz & 
Lien, 2013; Skarstein, 2013), I have chosen the topic for my master thesis. The formulation of 
the objective has dictated the choice of literature for the review. In Scandinavian social science 
and humanity research there has traditionally existed distinction between the cognitivist and the 
social constructivist theories (Skarstein, 2013, p.35). Penne (2006) describes this debate 
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focusing on the previous research where an individual’s meaning making of the world around 
occurs through language (pp. 24-27). 
Both the cognitivist and the social constructivist approaches are comprehensive and have been 
elaborated by a number of researchers. In order to achieve the objective of the thesis, i.e. to 
clarify how Vygotsky’s ideas on meaning making can be operationalized in special needs 
pedagogy, I have selected three scholars, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson representing the 
cognitivist approach to meaning making (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 1990; 2003) 
and Jerome Bruner – the social constructivist (Bruner, 1986; 1990). The main reason for this 
choice is that these researchers can be named as founders of a comprehensive meaning making 
theory, encompassing language and thinking as the driving force of meaning making, as was 
once pointed out by Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1934/2012). Bruner and Lakoff & Johnson have 
elaborated on the idea that human mind is pattern-recognizing and pattern-building, suggesting 
cognitive metaphor and narrative, correspondingly, as patterns at root of human thinking.   
I have focused my attention on the fundamental works by Lakoff in co-authorship with Johnson, 
and by Bruner revealing the groundbreaking ideas which later constituted the cornerstones of 
meaning making and which in their turn were further developed in relevant subsequent 
research. In the following subsections of this chapter I will point out the main ideas in the 
scholars’ works and will also explain how the scientific paradigm within which their research 
has been carried out, cognitivism and social constructivism, can help understanding the ideas 
behind their theories. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that I have also taken into 
consideration ideas and thoughts by other researchers who have contributed to the field, 
however, only to the extent when it was necessary to reveal the complexity and versatility of 
the issues discussed.  Therefore, I have confined my discussion mainly to what has become the 
major source of refence in meaning making in similar research.  
Another methodological issue which needs to be explained is the use of empirical data. Since 
the practice of meaning making application is somewhat disjointed, it does not seem possible 
to give account of certain cases when meaning making applies, either using a qualitative or a 
quantitative research method. Instead, I have chosen to give some examples of the use of 
meaning making to illustrate the theoretical discussion. When discussing relevance and 
application of meaning making in special needs pedagogy in the corresponding subsections on 
the pedagogical potential of metaphor and narrative, I give some examples from my own 
practice and share some reflections on my observations of the counselling process at Statped-
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Nord2 to illustrate how meaning making has already found its way into the field of special needs 
pedagogy. 
2.2. My background and development of the research interest within the topic 
I got my first pedagogical education in Arkhangelsk, in Russia. The Russian pedagogy 
acknowledges Vygotsky’s genius and in fact is based on Vygotsky’s theory. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Lev Vygotsky is the greatest authority and mastermind for the whole 
pedagogical school in Russia. Being a student, I got acquainted with the core conceptions of 
his theory and studied some of them more thoroughly in my master thesis devoted to the 
acquisition of a foreign language by children of the school age. I focused then on the zone of 
proximal development in foreign language teaching and emergence of ‘academic concepts’ 
from ‘everyday (spontaneous) concepts’ (Vygotsky’s terms) in the process of learning and 
teaching at school. Inevitably, the issue of the unity of language and thinking in the process of 
conceptualization of the world caught my attention.  
Later, I got interested in the topic of how language as a storage of values of a certain linguo-
cultural community impacts people’s conceptualization of the world and whether there is a 
difference in the naive pictures of the world of peoples speaking different languages. This led 
me to an idea to make a linguistic research of the issue and apply for a research position at the 
Hertzen State Pedagogical Institute in Saint Petersburg. My linguistic research was devoted to 
the cognitive metaphor of quantitative change (Melenteva, 2001), and the basis for it was 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphors in everyday language. 
Through my practice as a teacher, I realized the potential of applying metaphoric 
conceptualization in work with children with different challenges, mainly behavioral and 
emotional.  
Being a master student in special needs pedagogy at the University of Tromsø, I got inspired 
by lectures on meaning making within the course of ‘Social and Emotional Difficulties’ 
(Skarstein, 2015; Schultz & Lien, 2013). Then, I first got to know about the theory of meaning 
making and two different approaches to it: cognitivist and social constructivist. This provoked 
my research interest mainly to the narrative conceptualization of the outer reality and I started 
reading Jerome Bruner’s works.  
                                                 
2 The counselling process took place at the meetings of the working group specializing in complex 
learning difficulties at Statped-Nord in April 2017. The workshop was devoted inter alia to the application of 
psychoeducation in Statped’s counselling. Gidske Kvilhaug (senior advisor from Statped-Sørøst) provided 
recommendations to specialists of Statped-Nord regarding children with Tourette and AD/HD (OCD; ODD etc).   
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I have realized that meaning making is in the focus in different fields of science and I could not 
avoid reading and being acquainted with other relevant research in these fields. I was fascinated 
by two scholars in this regard: medical sociologist Aaron Antonovsky and neurologist and 
psychiatrist Viktor Frankl. Antonovsky’s salutogenesis and the sense of coherence 
(Antonovsky, 1987) led me to an idea to describe the psychoeducational practice of Statped-
Nord in my internship report in terms of Antonovsky’s three meaning making stages: 
intelligibility, meaningfulness, manageability. Frankl’s logotherapy and existential psychology 
(Frankl, 1992) inspired me for further reading of psychological research. 
Meaning making is central for cognitive psychology whose cognitive model is based on the 
hypothesis that it is not the situation “that determines what peoples feel but rather the way in 
which they construe the reality” (Beck, 1995, p.14). Aaron Beck’s3 idea behind it is that 
cognitive therapy intends to produce a cognitive change in patient’s construction of reality 
(Beck, 1995, p.2). This is exactly the purpose of trauma-based cognitive-behavioral therapy 
(Cohen et al. 2012). This therapy employs both narrative (Grosso, 2012, p.166-174) and 
metaphor as part of psychoeducation (Grosso, 2012, p.1591-161) in work with children with 
developmental disabilities. The most interesting part of my readings of psychological research 
has become ‘narrative therapy’ (Payne, 2000; White, 2007) because I have realized how 
Bruner’s ideas on ‘talking cures’ can be implemented in practice.   
Despite their usefulness and thought-provoking power, the above-mentioned theories have little 
to do with pedagogy, they rather deal with psychological or psychotherapeutic interventions 
with clients of different age. These theories were rather guiding in my search of the research 
topic for the present master thesis than decisive. Antonovsky’s sociological research, Frankl’s 
existential psychology, Beck’s cognitive psychology, White’s narrative therapy have confirmed 
my hypothesis that in dealing with child’s meaning making within pedagogy or special needs 
pedagogy, one needs to go to the root of pedagogical theory of child’s development, namely to 
Vygotsky’s theory. This is how I have defined my research objective for this thesis.  
2.3. Vygotsky’s research 
It is widely argued that Vygotsky left a huge heritage (Bruner, 1986, p.72). His theory is 
complex and versatile. Vygotsky never ceased to uphold the principle of reconstruction of 
psychological phenomena from data seemingly belonging to many different disciplines 
(Kozulin, 1986). It is difficult to say whether he was only a linguist, a psychologist or a 
                                                 
3 Aaron T. Beck is considered to be the developer and refiner of cognitive therapy. 
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pedagogue. His significance for all these fields of knowledge is impossible to overestimate, 
however, I will allow myself to risk assuming that his interest in the development of child’s 
conceptual systems, thought and language through scaffolding within the zone of proximal 
development makes it possible to attribute his theory rather to pedagogy (or pedology4  – 
Vygotsky’s term) than linguistics or psychology. Kozulin (1986) observes, that “for him culture 
and consciousness constituted the actual subject of inquiry, while psychology remained a 
conceptual tool, important but hardly universal”. 
I have read and used in my thesis almost all of Vygotsky’s works gathered in L.S. Vygotsky’s 
collection of works in six volumes, except for those devoted to the scientific methodology and 
the psychology of art. In particular, I have studied thoroughly the following publications in 
Russian: Thought and Language - volume 2 (Vygotsky, 1934/2012), Lectures on Psychology – 
volume 2 (1982), The evolution of high mental functions - volume 3 (Vygotsky, 1983a), The 
issues of child (age-related) psychology - volume 4 (Vygotsky, 1984), The foundations of 
defectology - volume 5 (Vygotsky, 1983). I have also read articles and books which are 
available on the Internet and as well those which I found in the Arkhangelsk city library in 
Russia in summer 2017. The fact that Russian is my mother tongue allows me to have a direct 
access to authentic works by Vygotsky which, in its turn, makes it possible to study a lot more 
other sources than those translated into either English or Norwegian. 
Some of Vygotsky’s works and many parts of his works are translated into different languages, 
including English and Norwegian. The existing translations seem to put certain limits on 
understanding of Vygotsky’s ideas. Therefore, after certain considerations, I have chosen to 
translate the quotations myself, with a few exceptions. In case of confusing wording, I have 
used the translation of Vygotsky’s ‘Thought and Language’ into English by Hanfmann, Vakar, 
Kozulin (2012). Their translation is a revised and extended version based on additional research 
of other sources. 
There are a few methodological and ethical challenges arising from the work with both 
Vygotsky’s original and translated texts, one of them being the specifics of his style of writing 
and the choice of terms. Vygotsky wrote a lot, often repeating himself,5 sometimes just briefly 
                                                 
4  In the beginning of the 20th century there was applied an interdisciplinary approach to child 
development and to denote this approach Vygotsky used the term ‘pedology’. It “was a widely used term, meant 
to designate a sort of scientific basis for pedagogics” (Kozulin, 1986: lvii).  
5 For example, cf. chapter 4 and chapter 7 in Thought and Language (Vygotsky, 1934/2012). 
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outlining ideas.6 It can be assumed that some things he considered self-evident or some things 
he intended to continue to develop in his later works which he never wrote because of his 
premature death at the age of 37. From this perspective, a methodological challenge has been 
to ensure a proper source reference. Therefore, at times I refer to several pages in one and the 
same work to confirm the same idea to secure the accuracy of research.  
Moreover, Vygotsky tried to disguise some ideas due to the requirements of the Soviet ideology 
(Leontiev, 2014, p.6). Furthermore, some of Vygotsky’s posthumous publications were 
substantially revised with regard to the contemporary Soviet ideology which distorted the 
meaning of Vygotsky’s ideas. The team of his collaborators, known as Vygotsky Circle, made 
a substantial work deciphering his notes and interpreting his ideas. Among the most famous of 
them were Luria,7 Leontiev, Vygotskaya, Zaporozhec, Elkonin, Galperin and some others. It 
should be mentioned that their interpretations of Vygotsky’s ideas differ, sometimes to a greater 
extent (Leontiev, 2014, p.6).  
More recent research on Vygotsky theory is carried out by a few researchers, among them Van 
den Veer and Valsiner (1991, 2014), Yasnitsky (2011, 2012, 2014), Kozulin (1986a, 2014). 
Acknowledging the merits of all these scholars, I have chosen to rely on Alex Kozulin’s 
research. I like his approach because, in my opinion, he does not step beyond interpretation into 
the sphere of own theorizing. By this I mean that he focuses on revealing Vygotsky’s ideas in 
a clearer way rather than adjusts Vygotsky’s theory to his own research. I refer to Kozulin’s 
interpretation of those Vygotsky’s ideas which I myself found challenging to understand. 
Vygotsky’s theory is complex, and it is not always possible to single out and discuss certain 
elements of it. Therefore, scaffolding, the zone of proximal development, higher psychic 
(mental) functions, academic and everyday (spontaneous) concepts etc. can be understood only 
in connection with each other. At the risk of oversimplification of Vygotsky’s ideas, sometimes 
I had to summarize them shortly in a more or less articulated version within the limits of this 
master thesis. I tried to follow Vygotsky’s line of thinking as precisely as possible. Since some 
of his language is difficult or even impossible to translate or even render in English, I had to 
interpret his position and formulate it with my words. The ethical challenge in this regard can 
be the risk of plagiarism, and I cannot but mention that I am aware of such a risk in research 
                                                 
6 For example, the significance of voluntary and emotional spheres for meaning making (Vygotsky, 1934/ 
2012, pp.344-345). 
7 By the way, it was Luria who drew Bruner’ attention to Vygotsky’s theory and helped him with 




like this. In cases when it was not possible to verify my interpretations and conclusions via 
experts’ opinion, I suggest my version, but I always indicate this in the text of the thesis (for 
example, by saying “I understand it in the following way”, “I suggest understanding it like…” 
or “it seems possible to interpret it like…” etc).  
When examining Vygotsky’s works, I have paid attention to the fact that some of his ideas are 
less known than others, despite their value for pedagogy. One often associates Vygotsky’s 
theory with the zone of proximal development and scaffolding (in fact, the latter is not 
Vygotsky’s term). Undoubtedly, these concepts are important, but I have also decided to shed 
some light on some other ideas which are worth researching on in connection with meaning 
making: private speech/inner speech/verbal thinking, personal mental-emotional experience (in 
Russian: переживание, perezhivanie) and imitative modelling (in Russian: подражание, 
podrazhanie). These ideas I discuss in chapter 3. 
2.4. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson and cognitive semantics 
Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of cognitive or conceptual metaphors has become central for 
meaning making due to its explanatory force regarding primary mechanisms of human 
cognition. Lakoff and Johnson’s research falls within the scope of cognitive science. Cognitive 
science focuses on the inner mental activities such as thinking, perception, memory, language, 
attention, and problem-solving (Cooper, 1993, p.12). In other words, cognitive science brings 
together the knowledge about human mind from psychology, linguistics, anthropology, 
philosophy and computer science (Lakoff, 1987, p.xi). It uses a computational metaphor to 
define the mind: information comes in, is being processed, and leads to certain outcomes 
(Ertmer & Newby, 1993, p.50). The main questions it tries to answer is how our conceptual 
systems are organized and how we make sense of our experience (Lakoff, 1987, p.xi). These 
are the questions which are directly concerned with meaning making.  
Language is not only viewed as a means of communication but as a cognitive instrument 
contributing to conceptualization of knowledge. This postulate goes back as late as Vygotsky’s 
groundbreaking work ‘Thought and Language’ (Vygotsky, 1934/2012). Since language has 
been viewed as an inseparable component of mind activity leading to creation of sense and 
meaning, cognitive semantics has played a crucial role in the evolution of meaning making 
theories. Its significance was also acknowledged by Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.13). 
Cognitive semantics specifies, as a point of departure, that language is part of a more general 
human cognitive ability, and can, therefore, only describe the world as people perceive it (Croft 
& Cruse, 2004, p.3). Fillmore’s frame semantics (Fillmore, 2006), Langacker’s cognitive 
15 
 
grammar (Langacker, 1987), Lakoff & Johnson’s cognitive metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 
2003) and Rosch’s prototypes (Rosch, 1983) have paved the way to viewing language structures 
as keys to mental representations (Melenteva, 2001).  
What makes Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive metaphor theory stand a little apart is that it pays 
tribute to social and cultural prerequisites of meaning making, thus bridging the cognitivist and 
the social constructivist views on meaning making. For Lakoff, meaning is what is meaningful 
to thinking. The central concern for his study of reason and sense is “the nature of the thinking 
organism and how it functions in its environment” (Lakoff, 1987, p.xi). Lakoff and Johnson’s 
theory is based on the famous postulate that “our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, 
then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter 
of metaphor” (Lakoff &Johnson, 2003, p.3).  
I have read and used the following works by Lakoff and Johnson, mainly for the reason of their 
centrality: Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), Conceptual Metaphor in 
Everyday Life (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), Lakoff’s Women, Fire and Dangerous Things 
(Lakoff, 1987) and some others. 
Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of cognitive metaphor seems plausible for the explanation of how 
Vygotsky’s ideas on the formation of conceptual systems can be understood for the purposes 
of special needs pedagogy. Their theory of metaphorical thinking spells out peculiarities of 
conceptualization of either physical or cultural phenomena in a common human mind. This 
theory brings to light how the conceptual system operates in its entirety, how conceptual 
representations are coordinated, and, thus, this theory can help to understand where deviations 
in language, thinking and meaning making occur in the course of child’s development.  
2.5. Jerome Bruner and social constructivism 
Interestingly, both cognitive and social constructivist approaches seek an answer for the same 
question: how one can describe a pattern according to which categorization occurs (Skarstein, 
2013, p.35). Bruner’s narrative construction of reality is one of the possible answers to this 
question. In fact, Jerome Bruner was one of the pioneers of cognitive psychology but later in 
his famous book ‘Acts of Meaning’, Bruner (1990) refuted the computational approach to the 
study of the mind, thus taking a huge step from cognitivism to constructivism. There is a 
fundamental difference between cognitivism and social constructivism. For constructivists 
meaning is not in the mind of a speaker but something which is constructed in communication 
between speakers.  Cobley (2001) explains:  
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The “constructivist” approach sees meaning neither in the control of the producer nor 
the thing being represented; instead, it identifies the thoroughly social nature of the 
construction of meaning, the fact that representational systems, rather than their users 
and objects, allow meaning to occur. (p.3) 
The term social constructivism was first introduced in Berger and Luckmann’s book “The social 
construction of reality” (Berger & Luckmann, 1971). The telling title of the book points to the 
main idea which underlies this theory of knowledge: knowledge about the world is constructed 
in social interactions. Social constructivism can be considered a scientific paradigm whose 
focus is on an individual’s learning and development occurring in the process of social 
intercourse.  
I have read and used the following works by Bruner: Acts of Meaning (Bruner, 1990), Life as 
Narrative (Bruner, 2004), Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Bruner, 1986). I have chosen these 
works because they seem to encompass the main postulates and ideas of Bruner’s theory.  
Bruner’s ideas about constructing the knowledge of the world and making meaning of new life 
experiences in the setting of culturally conditioned social intercourse in the form of narrative, 
stand close to social constructivism. Bruner specifies, “the constructivist view is that ‘stories’ 
do not ‘happen’ in the real world but rather, are constructed in people’s heads” (Bruner, 2004, 
p.691). He puts forward the idea that the stories, which are constructed in people’s heads, are 
based on a narrative-pattern. This idea has become very popular, inter alia in narrative therapy. 
Polkinghorne (1988) gives a pertinent definition of narrative, very much in Bruner’s style:  
Narrative is a scheme by means of which human beings give meaning to their 
experience of temporality and personal actions. Narrative meaning functions to give 
form to the understanding of a purpose to life and to join everyday actions and events 
into episodic units. It provides a framework for understanding the past events of one’s 
life and for planning future actions. It is the primary scheme by means of which human 
existence is rendered meaningful. (p.11)  
Taken into consideration the above-said, it is reasonable to argue that narrative possesses a 
significant potential for pedagogy. The possibility to construct narratives together with a child 
and in this way to teach a child social codes, cultural norms and impact on deviations, makes 
Bruner’s narrative theory an instrument operationalizing Vygotsky’s pillar idea of ‘personal 




Chapter 3. Meaning making in Vygotsky’s theory 
 
This chapter is devoted to the examination of the origin of meaning making in the process of 
development of child’s higher mental functions and formation of his or her conceptual systems. 
I will describe how meaning making evolves under the influence of maturing cognitive (mental) 
functions and socially meaningful activity in the zone of proximal development.  I will also 
point out and discuss how imitative modelling and personal mental-emotional experience 
contribute to child’s meaning making. 
3.1. Child’s development from a cognitive perspective 
3.1.1. The concept of meaning 
The study of the development of meanings in the course of child’s development constituted one 
of Vygotsky’s greatest experimental tasks, together with the comparative study of everyday 
spontaneous and academic concepts (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.4). Vygotsky understood 
meaning as an internal side of a sign (word) (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.12). He writes: “meaning 
is an indispensable part of a word as such, it belongs to the sphere of speech to the same extent 
as it belongs to the sphere of thought” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.13). Meaning has its own 
structure and tends to be fixed by a sign. Moreover, “thought is not reflected by a word, it is 
created in a word, that is what meaning is” (Vygotsky 1934/2012, p.294, p.296, p.347). 
Vygotsky explains:  
Meaning is the path from a thought to a word. It is not the sum of all the psychological 
operations that lie behind the meanings of words, it is something more specific - it is 
the internal structure of a sign operation. (in Hanfmann et al., 2012, p. 209) 
Vygotsky specifies that “meaning contains generalized reality”, i.e. meaning is not equalled to 
a particular referent, it arises as a result of generalization of the knowledge about the referent 
(Vygotsky 1934/2012, p.12). I understand it in the following way: once the referent is 
nominated, it is included into communication and here begins the process of generalization 
(conceptualization) and once this process is complete, there arises the meaning of the word.  
Vygotsky explains that a word does not refer to a separate object, but to a group or a class of 
objects. Therefore, “every word is an implicit generalization, thus, from a psychological 
perspective, the meaning of a word is a generalization” (Vygotsky 1934/2012, p.12). He 
maintains that “generalization is an extraordinary verbal act of thought, reflecting the reality in 
a totally different way than it is reflected in immediate sensations and perceptions” (p.12). 
Vygotsky clarifies it by saying that “generalization occurs as a synthesis of thoughts, but not 
by way of including the perceived objects into groups” (Vygotsky 1934/2012, p.267). Here, he 
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seems to come to an important point that “the highest human forms of psychological 
communication are possible because a human reflects the reality in a generalized way with the 
help of thinking” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.14) and that this generalization becomes possible in 
the course of verbal communication between people (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.13). From this it 
becomes clear that Vygotsky considers meaning making as a process occurring “as a unity of 
generalization and communion, communication and thinking” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.15). 
3.1.2. Developmental approach and mental functions 
The essence of child’s development, according to Vygotsky, can be apprehended only through 
a study of its origin and history. For that reason, he applies the term ‘development’ to both the 
individual (ontogenetic) and the cultural-historic (phylogenetic) evolution of mental functions. 
He suggests that “the new developmental approach must be built upon three concepts: higher 
mental functions, cultural development, and mastering one’s own behavioral processes” 
(Kozulin, 1986, pp. xliv- xliv).  
The core idea of this approach is that connections and relations between mental functions, 
including language and thought, do not remain constant. The process of development does not 
only depend on the changes which mental functions undergo, but rather on the changes in the 
relations between mental functions. In the process of child development, “one observes 
everywhere what is called the change in inter-functional connections and relations” (Vygotsky, 
1982, p.379). These relations between mental functions Vygotsky called ‘psychological’ 
(mental or cognitive) systems. Each stage of child’s development is characterized by its own 
combination of higher mental functions in psychological systems (Vygotsky, 1982, p.379).  
Importantly, language and thinking are the two higher mental functions which are decisive in 
the establishment of inter-functional systemic unity (Kozulin, 1986, p. xlvii), and only with the 
establishment of the latter “thinking becomes verbal and speech becomes intellectual” 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.96).  
Vygotsky does not give a definition of a mental function (a ‘psychological function’ in his 
terms). However, from his description it seems to follow that mental functions refer to the basic 
ways of learning and responding to the environment for the purpose of survival (Vygotsky, 
1982). Mental functions are cognitive processes, like memory, perception, thinking and 
language. Vygotsky differentiates between two kinds of processes or functions: mental 
functions and higher mental functions. Vygotsky (1983a) writes:  
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Each function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social 
level, and later, on the individual level; first, between people (interpsychological), and 
then inside the child (intrapsychological). (p.145) 
A child is equipped with built-in mental abilities which develop in the course of acquiring 
experiences in environment, society and culture and which finally are internalized and become 
part of individual’s consciousness (Vygotsky, 1983a). This is an important idea, later elaborated 
by Bruner (1986), which I come back to in subsection 5.2. 
Higher mental functions do not occur spontaneously and without prompting. Vygotsky 
especially emphasizes this idea and develops in chapters 5 and 6 of his ‘Thought and Language’ 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012). Higher mental functions emerge in the process of joint socially 
meaningful activity of children and adults (Vygotsky, 1934/2012). Summarizing this idea of 
Vygotsky, Kozulin (1986) explains that “the function that at a certain point in time “belongs” 
jointly to the child and the adult then becomes appropriated and internalized by the child, 
becoming his or her inner psychological function” (p. xx). 
Higher mental functions are the result of cognitive maturing, when they acquire a voluntary and 
conscious character. In early childhood there dominates perception in the system of inter-
functional relations. At pre-school age memory becomes the dominant central function. The 
interrelation of the two of them is the main prerequisite for the psychological development of 
a child and the basis for the appearance of attention (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.208).  Attention 
allows structuring of the perceived information in accordance with what is already memorized 
(Vygotsky 1934/2012, p.208). When attention appears at school age, the character of the 
functions changes: they become voluntary and transform into higher mental functions due to 
child’s awareness of his or her intellectual resources. However, cognitive development is not 
the only factor impacting this transition. The learning process through formal schooling or 
informal collaboration between children and adults must not be underestimated. Children and 
adults experience the same situation and make joint meaning of this shared experience, as a 
result a child re-creates adults’ mode of behaviour as his/her own (imitative modelling) 
(Vygotsky 1934/2012, p.207) (more on this in 3.2.3.). 
Besides, there are two other elements which contribute to child’s meaning making: personal 
mental-emotional experience of a child and occurrence of an emerging mental function in the 
zone of proximal development. I will turn to the explanation of these elements in the 
corresponding subsections below. 
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3.1.3. Perception and memory 
In the next two subsections I will focus on the mental functions discussed by Vygotsky with 
regard to development of psychological systems in child’s consciousness: perception, memory, 
thinking and language.   
Perception is a mental function which occurs first when a child is born, and which triggers the 
initial meaning making process. Even at this initial stage, not possessing language, a child is 
capable of making meaning. Adults around a child name objects and phenomena, thus sharing 
this experience with a child. Vygotsky (1982) writes:  
 Understanding of an object, nomination of an object is given together with its 
perception, and as some special research shows, the perception of some objective sides 
of an object depends on the meaning, on the sense which accompanies perception. 
(p.372) 
Perception, originating in the right hemisphere of the brain and nomination, stimulating the left 
hemisphere, occur simultaneously and create a necessary basis for comprehension, i.e. meaning 
making. Perception is inseparable from comprehension. Vygotsky (1982) observes: 
“Experiments show that it is almost impossible to create such circumstances that our perception 
would be separated functionally from comprehension of the perceived object” (p.372). 
Describing an experiment conducted by Rorshach, when children were asked to describe a 
number of senseless symmetrical figures, Vygotsky comes to a conclusion that our 
comprehension of the figures varies but the tendency to ascribe meaning to figures (nominating 
them as a butterfly, a lamp, a tree) is always present (Vygotsky,1982, p.373). 
Children do not perceive the world chaotically, but in terms of certain patterns or categories 
(Vygotsky, 1982, p.375). Vygotsky does not suggest any definition of such patterns, neither 
does he provide us with a description of what these structures are like and how they function. 
However, his idea that meaning making (or comprehension in terms of generalizations) and 
categorical perception go hand in hand, has found its way into a number of cognitive theories 
describing meaning making in terms of patterns (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Beck, 1995, Gee 
1999: 52). Vygotsky (1982) observes:  
On the basis of the experimental data, we know that perception already in the early 
stages is characterized by structure and integrity, and that perception of the whole is 
prior to the perception of the parts. (p. 376) 
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This idea deserves a special emphasis. An infant perceives the world around as a whole, 
gradually starting to distinguish separate details and features in this whole. Vygotsky (1982) 
explains: “Everywhere, an infant’s perception, not mentioning an elder child, will always be 
determined by holistic situations” (p.377). Lacking the language, an infant memorizes the 
situations in all their complexity, i.e. “in the process of child’s development there evolves a 
connection between the function of perception and the function of eidetic memory, and there 
appears a new single whole, in the structure of which perception is its inner part” (Vygotsky, 
1982, p.379). 
Since language is not yet developed at such an early age, perception is mediated through 
nomination by an adult. It is not excluded then that naming certain objects, an adult draws an 
infant’s attention to some parts of a holistic situation and thus stimulates visual thinking in 
terms of words. Vygotsky (1982) maintains, “experience shows that here occurs the connection 
between speech or word and perception, that the usual way of perception changes, and we begin 
to consider perception through speech, when a child does not only perceive but tells about the 
perceived” (p.380). Moreover, Vygotsky lays emphasis to the appearance of meaning in this 
process. It seems possible to render his idea as follows: visual thinking and perception merge, 
and this fusion is such that we are unable to differentiate between categorical perception and 
immediate perception, i.e. when immediately perceiving an object, children categorize it 
simultaneously and as a result a generalized meaning arises (Vygotsky, 1982, p.369). 
With this, Vygotsky demonstrates that inter-functional connections change because of the 
appearance and development of new functions, creating new systems of mental functions, and 
these psychological systems are parts of the complex development of the consciousness where 
meaning making constitutes its core (Vygotsky, 1982, p.380). 
Another mental function actively participating in meaning making is memory. It has already 
been mentioned that eidetic memory occurs rather early as a necessary stage in the evolution of 
infant’s comprehension. Memory in early age is one of the central mental functions, all other 
functions develop depending of memory. Vygotsky’s analysis shows that child’s thinking at 
early stages depends a lot on memory: to think for a child in early years means to recollect, i.e. 
to base oneself on his/her experience (Vygotsky, 1982, p.392).  
Interestingly, according to Vygotsky (1982), memorizing one’s own actions and memorizing 
images obeys different laws. Interrupted unfinished actions are memorized better than 
accomplished, and vice versa unfinished visual images are memorized worse than 
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accomplished (p.395). Vygotsky does not explain it further and I suggest interpreting it as 
follows: an incomplete visual image seems to appear meaningless for a child and therefore is 
not memorized. At the same time, it seems that children remember that they were interrupted 
in their meaning making process when they do something and this fact gives meaning to the 
whole situation. An action is perceived as a structured sequence of elements (a pattern) and 
therefore, the strive to complete the structure results in memorizing. With reference to Levin’s 
experiments, Vygotsky concludes that senseless material is memorized only because there 
appears a structure (a pattern) in the mass of elements, which demonstrates meaningful 
connections between the parts (Vygotsky, 1982, p.388-389). Vygotsky (1982) clarifies: “the 
success of one’s memory depends on what pattern the material forms in one’s consciousness” 
(p.388). I suggest interpreting this Vygotsky’s idea as follows: human mind is tuned both to 
recognize patterns and build patterns.  
3.1.4. Thinking and language  
Vygotsky’s theory encompasses all mental functions but “Vygotsky himself was primarily 
interested in the development of language in its relation to thought” (Kozulin, 1986, p.xlv). 
Vygotsky (1934/2012) regards “the issue of thinking and language as a key problem of human 
psychology” (p.5). In his research Vygotsky considers language and thought as complimentary 
parts of one and the same process – meaning making, therefore it is rather difficult to examine 
his understanding of thinking and language irrespective of each other.  
Language was always the focus of Vygotsky’s research. What drew Vygotsky’s attention was 
language’s double role. Language is a psychological tool shaping other mental functions, and 
at the same time it is a mental function itself undergoing its own development (Kozulin, 1986, 
p. xlv).  
Thinking and language do not arise simultaneously. Vygotsky’s main idea is that “thought and 
speech have different genetic roots” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.83), and that “the curves of their 
development converge and diverge repeatedly, cross each other, align at times and go parallelly, 
even merge in some parts, and then separate again” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.82). Relations 
between thinking and language are never constant, “their development occurs according to 
different routes and independently from one another” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.94). In the 
phylogenesis and ontogenesis of thinking and speech, one can “undoubtedly distinguish pre-
language phase in mental development and pre-intellectual phase in speech development” 
(Vygotsky, 1934/ 2012, p.95, p.98). 
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 Language first appears as a means of communication and then nomination. This stage of its 
development Vygotsky (1982) describes as follows:  
A child always begins with pronunciation of separate words; these words are nouns in 
the beginning of development; later nouns are combined with verbs – there appear the 
so-called binomial sentences. In the third stage, there appear adjectives, and, finally, 
when supplied with a certain storage of phrases – a story with the description of 
pictures. This means that the sequence of the stages does not refer to the sequence of 
perception stages, but rather to the sequence of stages in speech development. (p. 378)  
Thinking and language become increasingly interdependent in the first few years of life and by 
the second year of life they become interwoven (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.96). As a result, 
“speech becomes intellectual while thinking becomes verbal” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.96). 
When thinking and language merge, the result is the appearance of verbal thinking. Vygotsky 
distinguishes two formal criteria in language development that characterize this “leap”: 
widening of the vocabulary because a child asks about the name of every new thing and a very 
fast intermittent increase of the vocabulary (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.96). Verbal thinking is 
“the unity of language and thinking that retains all the properties that belong to speech and 
thought as a single process” (Vygotsky, 1991, p.413). Vygotsky regarded the appearance of 
verbal thinking as the point in child’s development when meaning making becomes possible, 
therefore, it will be necessary to examine this ability in more detail. 
Verbal thinking arises gradually and undergoes several stages. The driving force of this process 
is the change of the vector in language’s functioning. At the outset, language aims outwards 
and is used by a child as a means of nomination and communication – in its social function 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.50), then language turns to the speaker and is used in child’s 
communication with himself or herself, i.e. aims inwards (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.45). 
Elaborating on Vygotsky’s idea, Leontiev (2014) clarifies: “language is initially oriented 
outwards and only then turning to oneself, i.e. it becomes the means of coordinating of one’s 
own mental processes” (p.12).  
Attracted by Paget’s research, Vygotsky turned his attention to the phenomenon of ‘egocentric 
speech’ of a child (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, pp.37-49).  His experiments, however, led to different 
conclusions (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, pp.49-56). According to Vygotsky, speech, as a 
psychological tool, mediates thinking at the stage of practical activity (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, 
p.44).  Indeed, children often talk to themselves and about themselves in the third person 
singular when carrying out some everyday activity or play (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.44, p.51). 
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Vygotsky called it ‘private speech’, turning to a thorough discussion of it in chapter 2 and 7 in 
his ‘Thought and Language’. Private speech which is not directed at any listener, “was 
interpreted by Vygotsky as an important developmental tool leading a child toward self-
regulation and voiceless verbal thinking” (Kozulin, 2012, pp. xv-xvi). Vygotsky (9134/2012) 
concludes, “private speech emerges on a social basis by way of transferring by a child of social 
forms of behaviour, forms of collective cooperation into the sphere of private psychological 
functions” (p.50). 
Egocentric speech does not die out, as Piaget suggested, private speech becomes internalized 
into inner speech – the means of self-guidance (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.45, p.47). Inner speech 
is silent, it is a speech for oneself, it serves the function to connect the outer reality with the 
inner world of a person (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.46). Inner speech is structurally different from 
social speech: it is understandable only for the speaker, it is reduced and has gaps (Vygotsky, 
1934/2012, pp.46-47). When child’s speech accompanies his or her activity, it becomes 
thinking, “i.e. takes upon itself the function of a planner of an operation, solution of a new task 
arising in a child’s behaviour” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.100). It seems possible to assume that 
in this function, inner speech becomes a tool creating a scenario for one’s actions, thus 
anchoring or shaping the meaning for a certain life situation. Interpreting Vygotsky’s writings 
on inner speech, Kozulin (1986) observes: 
Inner speech is not an internal aspect of talking; it is a function in itself. It remains 
however a form of speech, that is thought connected with words. But while in external 
speech thought is embodied in words, in inner speech words must sublimate in order 
to bring forth a thought. In inner speech two important processes are interwoven: the 
transition from external communication to inner dialogue and the expression of 
intimate thoughts in linguistic form, thus making them communicative. Inner speech 
becomes a psychological interface between, on the one hand, culturally sanctioned 
symbolic systems and, on the other hand, private “language” and imagery. The 
concretization of psychological activity in this context appears as a psychological 
mechanism for creating new symbols and word senses capable of eventually being 
incorporated into cultural stock. (p. liii) 
Private speech phenomenon has also been studied by some post-Vygotskians and has got a 
name of “crib speech phenomenon” (e.g. Berk, 2001). This research has developed into a vast 
area of studies on the relationship between different forms of verbalization and the cognitive 
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processes involved in executive functions (inter alia, self-regulation, and problem solving) 
(Winser, Fernyhough, & Montero, 2009). 
 It has been proved that crib speech is not a by-product of the child’s immaturity, but it is “an 
important mechanism for the consolidation of children’s experiences, language practice, and 
acquisition of such social communication forms as dialogue” (Kozulin, 2012, p. xvi). 
Experiments show that “crib speech is often much richer than the daytime communicative 
speech of the same child, and as such provides a glimpse into the child’s future development” 
(Kozulin, 2012, p. xvi). It has been established that children progressing faster from private to 
inner speech also showed better sustained attention and were less distractible. On the contrary, 
children with learning problems often display self-talking that is not tasks’ related. They can 
chant, repeat, use non-guiding comments for a longer developmental period than children 
without learning problems (Winser, Fernyhough, & Montero, 2009). 
To summarize, so far, I have discussed the evolution of mental functions and their collaboration 
in changing psychological systems of a child. The appearance of verbal thinking is an important 
milestone in the establishment of child meaning making. When private speech appears, 
language becomes an instrument of self-guidance, and with the appearance of inner speech 
meaning making becomes self-regulated.  
3.1.5. Everyday spontaneous and academic concepts 
3.1.5.1. The development of everyday spontaneous concepts  
Yet another issue which interested Vygotsky was the conceptual systems arising as a result of 
meaning making and structuring the human mind in certain ways. He discussed this issue in 
several works but the most thorough and substantial description of his experimental research 
can be found in chapters 5 and 6 in ‘Thought and Language’ (Vygotsky, 1934/2012). He focuses 
on the emergence of conceptual systems, instead of describing the final product of their 
evolution. The latter approach he considers to be a mistake because “when studying the 
definitions that a child gives to a concept, we rather study a child’s knowledge, the extent of 
his language development, than thinking as such” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.111). In other 
words, Vygotsky was rather interested in the process of meaning making than the principles of 
organization of conceptual systems, and, thus, he included into his research both “the sensual 
material and the word” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.111), i.e. peculiarities of child’s cognitive and 
cultural maturing and child’s language development. 
Vygotsky differentiated between two types of concepts: everyday (spontaneous) and academic 
(scientific). The former appear as a result of child’s own experience in the outer world, while 
26 
 
the latter arise due to a deliberate instructional activity of an adult in the zone proximal 
development of a child and only then when the relevant brain structures are mature enough. 
Vygotsky (1934/2012) formulates a law of the emergence of concepts: 
 the development of processes leading to emergence of concepts goes far back to 
childhood, but only in transitional age (Vygotsky means adolescence here – MM) 
there mature and develop those intellectual functions which form a psychological 
basis for conceptual systems. Only when a child turns to an adolescent, a decisive 
transition to thinking in terms of concepts becomes possible. (p. 123) 
Another important issue in focus of Vygotsky’s research is how concepts appear, what is crucial 
for their emergence in child’s consciousness. First of all, concepts do not appear “as a result of 
memorization”, it is necessary that a child comes across or gets a socially meaningful task and 
“this task is impossible to solve without forming a concept” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.115, 
p.125). The second prerequisite is that a child uses “the sign (or word) functionally (consciously 
and voluntary – MM) as a means of subordination to one’s will of one’s own psychological 
operations” and, thus, “directs these processes to the solution of a socially meaningful task” 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.124). This point needs some clarification, in my opinion. What 
Vygotsky seems to say here is that a word or sign serves the function of ‘a knot’, like the one 
we tie on a handkerchief to remember something. Tying this knot, a child consciously 
concentrates on a task, synthesizing “associations, attention, mental presentation, judgement, 
determination etc.” in order to form a concept (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.124). 
Vygotsky distinguishes several stages in the process of emergence of concepts. The first stage 
in early age is when a child unities objects or phenomena in diffusive unsystematic groups 
without realizing the criterion of this unification. This unification is based on associations, 
similarity, syncretic chain etc. If it concerns particular objects of the outer reality, it can happen 
that meanings will coincide with those of adults (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, pp.128-129).  The 
second stage is called the formation of complexes (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.130). At this stage, 
a child stops thinking syncretically, his or her own personal association do not longer serve the 
basis for unification of phenomena into certain groups (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.131).  
The complexes are rather “family groups” based on actual, not abstract or associative, 
connections between the objects of a complex (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.132). For children with 
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special needs8, especially those who have language problems, these complexes or collections 
of complexes remain the main mode of conceptualization and play a huge role (Vygotsky, 
1934/2012, p.135). Complex thinking is complicated and undergoes different substages: simple 
complexes, hierarchical complexes, complexes-collections, functional complexes, diffusive 
complexes and finally pseudo-concepts (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, pp.131-146). This is a task in 
itself to describe Vygotsky’s differentiation between these substages of complex thinking. This 
differentiation certainly has a great significance for the research aimed at the study of cognitive 
abilities of a child. Despite its relevance for meaning-making, it goes into details which do not 
constitute the objective of this thesis and thus, I have chosen to avoid a thorough description of 
this issue. More importantly, it is necessary to explain what is the main difference between 
child’s complex thinking and adolescent’s conceptual thinking. 
Child’s words coincide with words of an adult in their objective reference, i.e. “they point to 
the same objects and to the same range of phenomena. But they do not coincide in the meaning” 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.154).  A child realizes the content of meaning in a different way, 
although similarly, and due to this similarity communication becomes possible (Vygotsky, 
1934/2012, p.154). An adult and a child point to the same object but mentally differently: a 
child names an object, while an adult thinks about it and realizes its meaning (Vygotsky, 
1934/2012, p.157). A child regards the connections between his or her perceptions of objects 
or phenomena as meanings, while in fact it is not the phenomena but the perceptions that are 
connected in a created meaning (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.275). Adolescent and adult’s thinking 
implies isolation of certain features of a phenomenon or thing, comprehending them in an 
abstract way, due to which other non-relevant features remain in the periphery of a concept 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, pp.160-162).  
This is a very important issue for the understanding of child’s meaning making: child’s meaning 
making is always situationally and specifically conditioned and relies on generalizations of 
perceptions. A child cannot isolate important and significant for him or for her features of the 
phenomenon of which meaning is made. Thus, a child must rely on common sense and world 
knowledge (cf. Bruner’s folk psychology).  Meaning does not occur, it is constructed. Immature 
cognitive processes of a child cannot contribute to meaning making to full extent. The final 
product of child’s meaning making is similar to the one of an adult (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, 
                                                 
8 Vygotsky does not specify what diagnoses encompass his notion of “neuro- and mental patients”. It 
should be mentioned that the classification of mental disorders was different at his time. From his research in 
defectology, where he describes certain cases, it becomes clear that these patients seemed to have ADHD/ADD, 
SLD, OCD, ASD, ADD, schizophrenia, epilepsy etc. (Vygotsky 1983). 
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pp.143-144) because a child internalizes meanings already given in the speech of an adult 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.145). Thus, the impact of social and cultural context for meaning 
making is difficult to underestimate. Folk theories turn to become central for the development 
of meaning making in children (more on this in 5.3.).  
3.1.5.2. The development of academic concepts 
So far, I have described the appearance of everyday (spontaneous) concepts which are not 
exactly the same as concepts of an adult. Adolescence is the transitional period when thinking 
undergoes a crisis and becomes mature (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.167). This period embodies 
the transition to the formation of true concepts. A decisive role in true concepts’ formation 
belongs to language. A word directs attention to certain features of a phenomenon, “with the 
help of a word a child synthesizes these features, with the help of a word a child symbolizes the 
abstract and operates with a word as a sign” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.165).  
Complex thinking of a child “is not ousted by conceptual thinking, they exist together” 
(Vygotsky, 1934/ 2012, p.167). These forms of thinking “co-exist as there co-exist layers from 
different geological epochs in the Earth’s crust” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.167). Everyday and 
academic concepts “are not separated from each other by an impenetrable wall, do not flow 
through isolated channels, but undergo the process of continuous interaction” (Vygotsky, 
1934/2012, p.190). Importantly, both everyday and academic concepts comply with the single 
set of laws of concept formation based on generalization (Vygotsky 1934/2012, p.190, p.249). 
Academic concepts rely on everyday concepts exactly in the same way as a foreign language 
relies on the semantics of a native language (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.195). What makes them 
different is the motive of their acquisition: everyday concepts arise spontaneously urged by the 
necessity to solve a task in a socially meaningful practical activity, while academic concepts 
arise in an instructional setting in the process of formal schooling (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, 
p.191). The mode of their acquisition is also different: acquisition of an academic concept 
begins with an understanding of a verbal definition of the given concept and implies a voluntary 
application of this concept (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.250). 
From a cognitive perspective, emergence of academic concepts becomes possible due to the 
change in the character of mental functions: in adolescence a teenager acquires higher mental 
functions of voluntary attention and logic memory (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.205; Vygotsky, 
1982). Vygotsky clarifies that “voluntary character of a function is the downside of its 
awareness” or “intellectualization” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.205). Awareness comes through 
acquisition of academic concepts (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.210) and is a synonym of 
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systematicity (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.211). It means that “awareness of one’s concepts comes 
through constructing of conceptual systems, based on some relations of commonness” 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.214). 
Another prerequisite for the emergence of academic concepts is a child-adult cooperation in the 
educational instructional setting in the zone of proximal development of a child (Vygotsky, 
1934/2012, p.178). However, examination of this issue proceeds to the sphere of child’s 
development viewed from a social-cultural perspective and will be regarded in the next section.  
Vygotsky’s ideas have later been elaborated within both the cognitivist and the social 
constructivist approaches. Cognitivists explore the principles of conceptual organization of 
human mind and the basis for concepts to arise. Vygotsky does not explain what conceptual 
bonds require for a concept to appear, neither does he explain how concepts interact in thinking. 
This lack of research has made me look into Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of cognitive metaphor 
(chapter 4). Vygotsky pays tribute to the significance of everyday (spontaneous) concepts in 
child’s development, but he does not explain how these ‘folk theories’/everyday concepts are 
stored and function in a child’s brain and what happens if deviations occur. Therefore, this lack 
of information has led me to an idea to study Bruner’s folk psychology and significance of 
narrative, especially for pedagogical purposes (chapter 5). 
3.2. Child’s development from a social-cultural perspective 
Constructivists assert that children’s concepts are constructed rather than transmitted and a 
teacher has a certain role in the process of meaning making. This idea comes from Vygotsky’s 
view on a social-cultural development of a child. There is no consensus between constructivists 
on the role of a teacher. Independence of children in the learning process is claimed by radical 
constructivists, therefore, scientific misconceptions is quite a normal outcome in the learning 
process. Others underline a teacher’s special role in the conceptual change (Kozulin, 2012, 
p.xix). This discussion leads us naturally to the issue of mediated learning and socially 
meaningful activities., i.e. social-cultural approach to child’s development. 
3.2.1. Child’s socially meaningful activity and learning 
Cognitive processes do not arise by themselves but only out of social contexts where children 
are immediate participants of social activities. Higher mental functions develop in the course 
of children’s social interaction with either their peers or adults. Vygotsky was of the view that 
socially meaningful activities make children capable of interpreting the world, making 
meanings and, moreover, allow children to extract the psychological (cognitive) tools from their 
society and culture and use them for the purposes of their individual meaning making 
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(instrumentalism) (Vygotsky, 1991). Vygotsky proposed the view that social activities evolve 
into mental activities as a result of internalization9. Vygotsky (1979) writes:  
the mechanisms of social behavior and the mechanisms of consciousness are the 
same…. We are aware of ourselves, for we are aware of others, and in the same way 
as we know others; and this is as it is because in relation to ourselves we are in the 
same (position) as others are to us. (pp.29-30) 
The concept of socially meaningful activity (Tätigkeit) was proposed by Vygotsky as a 
generator of consciousness, because an individual’s consciousness is built from outside through 
relations with others (Kozulin, 1986, p. xxxviii). Vygotsky explains that ‘a socially meaningful 
activity’ does not necessarily presuppose some work being done or activity aiming at some 
product or a learning situation. Children’s main activity is exploring the world through game 
and play, or simply through practical tasks of eating, watching, listening etc. (Elkonin, 1978). 
Play allows children to cognitively and emotionally disclose themselves. While playing, 
children try on different roles, step beyond the limits of the world of a child. Acting like adults, 
they expand their repertoire of social, emotional and cognitive skills and abilities (Elkonin, 
1978). In Vygotsky’s words, “in play a child always behaves beyond his average age, above 
his daily behavior; in play it is as though he were a head taller than himself” (in Elkonin, 1978, 
p.102). At a later stage, when participating in organized games, children learn to follow 
established rules. They learn to adjust themselves to restrictions, anticipate and plan ahead, and 
acquire self-command. These are the skills crucial for successful participation in the adult 
world. 
Learning is a socially meaningful activity with adult participation. Vygotsky was of the view 
that through both formal teaching and informal conversations, adults reveal to children the 
modes which their culture employs to interpret the world – cultural tools (Vygotsky, 1991).  In 
higher mental functions adults share meanings of certain phenomena, thus, providing children 
with cognitive tools to construct academic concepts.  The general term which has been applied 
in subsequent research to such socially meaningful activities with adult participation is 
‘mediation’ or ‘mediated learning’.  
                                                 
9 This idea of Vygotsky was elaborated by a post-Vygtoskian M. Tomasello in his most interesting book 




Some scholars maintain that when adults help children to attach meaning to phenomena, they 
actually make the meaning of a certain situation common for both a child and an adult. This 
interaction in meaning making is known as mediated learning experience. It encourages a child 
to muse on life situations and create meanings out of them (Feuerstein, Klein, & Tannenbaum, 
1999; Kozulin & Presseisen, 1995). 
A well-known concept of scaffolding has aroused from Vygotsky’s assertion that children 
accomplish tasks easier and faster with the help of an adult in the zone of proximal 
development. Scaffolding is a range of supportive techniques used in an instructional context. 
I will mention just some of them which have come to my knowledge via the study of relevant 
literature in post -Vygotskian research: prompting, a model of the correct performance of a task, 
division of a complex task into smaller units, a structured set of guidelines for a task’s 
performance, a technical device or technology making a task manageable, shared (common) 
focus on relevant aspects of a task, asking guiding questions, frequent feedback on a child’s 
progress (Øzerk & Øzerk, 2013; Tharp & Gallimore, 1991; Rogoff, 1990; Wood, Bruner, & 
Ross, 1976). This is not a task for the present thesis to make an analysis of these scaffolding 
methods in mediated learning. Vygotsky’s theory enhances several important concepts crucial 
for successful scaffolding. I have chosen to shed light on the three of them: the zone of proximal 
development, imitative modelling, and personal mental-emotional experience. These three 
concepts drew my attention for a certain reason. The zone of proximal development has got a 
substantial interpretation and elaboration in subsequent research due to its centrality for 
Vygotsky’s theory. For this same reason, the zone of proximal development is included into 
my thesis, however rather for the purpose to support examination of the other two concepts. 
The other two concepts are less known to a wider readership and this novelty makes them 
especially attractive for research and valuable for examination in the present thesis: imitative 
modelling and personal mental-emotional experience. 
3.2.2. The zone of proximal development 
The zone of proximal development has been studied and applied a lot, it seems to be a well-
known construction. Therefore, I will not give a thorough description of it here in order to focus 
on more relevant issues related to it and important for the purposes of the present thesis. 
Vygotsky distinguishes between two ability levels characterizing child’s skills at a certain point 
in development. The first one characterizes the developmental level at which a child is capable 
of performing a task on his or her own without any support from an adult. The second level 
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characterizes a child’s potential sphere of abilities which only emerges and can be developed 
via scaffolding. Vygotsky (1934/2012) explains:  
The discrepancy between an intellectual age or the level of actual development, which 
is determined by independently solved tasks, and the level achieved by a child not 
independently but through cooperation – constitutes the zone of proximal 
development. (p.237) 
The zone of actual development is usually the zone which is tested at examinations at school, 
however this is the zone of proximal development which is significant for child’s successful 
intellectual development (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.237). What a child can do “in cooperation 
today becomes the zone of actual development tomorrow” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.240). 
The zone of proximal development is the area where adults provoke a child to solve tasks not 
yet mastered by him or her. When challenging a child, adults promote his or her cognitive 
growth. These challenging tasks must be, on the one hand, clear for a child and, on the other 
hand, manageable with adults’ assistance (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.240), otherwise meaning 
making fails. If a child-adult cooperation is successful, the final product of it “is a solution, 
which, being internalized, becomes an integral part of the child’s own reasoning” (Kozulin, 
1986, p. l).  
The description of levels and tasks of the zone of proximal development will be meaningless 
and superfluous without discussion of its content. ‘Podrazhanie’ (in Russian: ‘подражание’, 
podrazhanie) constitutes the content of the zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 
1934/2012, p. 240). I proceed with the description of it in the next subsection. 
3.2.3. Imitative modelling (podrazhanie)  
When cooperating with an adult in the zone of proximal development, children don’t learn by 
coping-pasting knowledge and experience, they rather mold things according to a suggested 
model. Such learning does not presuppose imitation because its purpose is internalization by a 
child of meanings (cognitive tools) and strategies of one’s culture (cultural tools) for child’s 
own use. This way of learning, Vygotsky called ‘podrazhanie’. Vygotsky (1966) writes:  
All that a child cannot accomplish on his own, but what he can learn or can perform 
under guidance or in collaboration with the help of suggestive questions or assistance 
provided at a difficult point, refers us to the domain of ‘podrazhanie’. (p.204) 
He attaches significance to this concept by saying that ‘podrazhanie’ is “the main form of 
human development impacted by learning” (Vygotsky 1934/2012, p. 240). It is difficult to 
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translate the term from Russian. ‘Podrazhanie’ is translated as ‘imitation’ (подражание, n.d.), 
but this is exactly what Vygotsky (1934/2012) warns us against: 
There has established a view on podrazhanie in former psychology and in everyday 
consciousness regarding it as purely mechanistic activity.  From this point of view, it 
is not indicative if a child solves a task not independently, it is not significant for 
child’s own intellectual development. It is assumed that one can imitate everything, 
whatsoever… This view is false though and through. (pp.237-238) 
Mechanistic imitation and ‘podrazhanie’ must be differentiated for an important reason. 
Imitation implies repetition and copying, it does not presuppose internalization of the learnt 
meaning. ‘Podrazhanie’ is the driving force for learning, it brings a child to another level in his 
or her development (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.239). Vygotsky clarifies that ‘podrazhanie’ is “the 
source of all new features of child’s consciousness” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.239). Learning is 
only then possible if a child is given an opportunity for ‘podrazhanie’ (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, 
p.240).  
Vygotsky proposes a constructivist approach to it: ‘podrazhanie’ – is rather internalization of 
somebody else’s model of behaviour or meaning through the prism of personal mental-
emotional experience (‘perezhivanie’ – in Vygotsky’s terms) and recreation of someone’s 
model of behaviour or meaningful life strategy as one’s own (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.247).  
Moreover, a child can ‘podrazhat’ only something which is within his or her intellectual 
capacities. One cannot recreate a chess game if one has never played chess, even if a chess 
grandmaster shows one how to do it. To be able to ‘podrazhat’, one needs to have a possibility 
to transit from what one can do to what one cannot yet do (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.238). Thus, 
recreation of somebody’s model of behaviour is possible only within the zone of proximal 
development (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.238). Therefore, it seems possible to deduce a few 
prerequisites for ‘podrazhanie’ from Vygotsky’s description: internalization of somebody’s 
knowledge and experience, re-creation of somebody’s model as one’s own, occurring through 
‘perezhivanie’ (personal mental-emotional experience), and taking place within the zone of 
proximal development (more on that also in 5.4. and 5.5.). Thus, in an attempt to reveal the 
essence of the concept, I take the courage to translate ‘podrazhanie’ as ‘imitative modelling’. 
Vygotsky’s ‘podrazhanie’ is an undeservedly forgotten idea. Focus in the follow-up studies and 
subsequent research was either on the zone of proximal development (ZPD) or scaffolding. 
They are the indispensable constituents of imitative modelling because imitative modelling 
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occurs in the zone of proximal development and becomes effective via instructional scaffolding. 
It may seem, that imitative modelling can be equalled to scaffolding, but I would rather disagree 
on that. The reason for my scepticism is that scaffolding lacks an important personal mental-
emotional aspect of meaning making –personal mental-emotional experience (‘perezhivanie’ – 
in Vygotsky’s terms). Imitative modelling is successful only if a child perceives the suggested 
challenging task as necessary for personal reasons (perceives it as meaningful), makes a 
conscious effort to solve it and becomes mentally and emotionally involved into its solution. 
All this results in the formation of a concept.  Having said this, I now proceed with the 
examination of the concept ‘perezhivanie’. 
3.2.4. Personal mental-emotional experience (perezhivanie) 
Despite his obvious interest in cognitive, social-cultural and language development of a child, 
Vygotsky did not disregard the importance of volitional-emotional sphere of a child and its 
impact on comprehension and learning (Vygotsky, 1933/2013; Vygotsky, 1991, pp.416-436). 
From his notes it seems to follow that he regretted not elaborating on these issues more in his 
previous works, and his plan was to continue research in this area (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, 
p.344). Vygotsky emphasizes that thought and meaning do not originate from another thought, 
rather they come from a volitional-emotional sphere of one’s consciousness. Vygotsky calls 
this volitional-emotional sphere – ‘motivational’. According to him it encompasses an 
individual’s interests, attitudes, assessments, volitions, intentions, endeavors, feelings and 
emotions. Only this motivational sphere can give answers to the main question – why meaning 
is made (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.344).   
How does the motivational sphere participate in meaning making? There is no clear answer to 
this question in Vygotsky’s theory. However, a careful analysis of somewhat disjointed 
statements and descriptions in Vygotsky’s works, allows to propose the following answer. The 
meaning of a situation is made for the reason that a child gets personally involved in the solution 
of a socially meaningful task. It presupposes awareness of the situation, a conscious effort to 
form a concept (mental involvement) and emotional engagement. In this regard, Vygotsky 
refers to ‘perezhivanie’ (переживание), which I have found a difficult term for translation.  
‘Perezhivanie’ is translated as ‘experience’ (переживание, n.d.). Nevertheless, taking into 
consideration that this experience concerns both mental involvement and emotional 
engagement, I have taken the courage to translate it as ‘personal mental-emotional experience’.  
Vygotsky (1966) describes it in the following way: personal mental-emotional experience 
(perezhivanie) is an internal attitude of a child or an adult to a moment of reality. It is not the 
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moment of reality as such, taken irrespective of a child, which matters, but the moment refracted 
through personal emotional experience of a child, determining how this particular moment will 
influence the course of further development of a child (pp.76-77).  
It has been demonstrated in the previous subsections that Vygotsky regarded meaning making 
as a process of comprehension of the outer realty, where meaning results from processing of 
one’s perceptions by a certain system of cognitive functions (cognitivism) in a social verbal 
intercourse between a child and an adult (social constructivism). However, meaning is 
construed only if a child attaches personal significance to a situation via mental and emotional 
involvement. An emotional involvement can either be viewed as an emotional reaction, 
occurring in a critical situation when a child needs to adjust himself or herself to a changed 
reality (Vygotsky, 1991, p.135), or a mental-emotional imprint of a moment of reality in a 
child’s consciousness (Vygotsky, 1966, p.77). In the latter case, one deals with a personal 
mental-emotional experience which anchors meaning in one’s consciousness.  
To emphasize the difference between emotional reactions and personal mental-emotional 
experiences, I would suggest understanding them in terms of consequences for meaning 
making. Emotional reactions “have the role of the organizers of our behavior” (Vygotsky, 1991, 
p.137), i.e. they are either a call for actions or a refusal from actions (Vygotsky, 1991, p.136). 
Emotional reactions do not trigger meaning making process. Personal mental-emotional 
experiences are “dynamic units constituting consciousness”, in every one of such units “all the 
properties of consciousness are given” (Vygotsky, 1966, p.216). A personal mental-emotional 
experience “is a concentration of unique features of a child’s character and personality at work 
when processing experience of interaction with a moment of reality” (Vygotsky, 1966, pp.79-
80). Therefore, it can be argued that personal mental-emotional experience is an element of 
meaning making. 
I draw much attention to the significance of personal mental-emotional experience because I 
argue that it is a necessary component of meaning making together with cognitive processes 
and social activity. It can be regarded an essential link, discovered by Vygotsky, between the 
cognitive and the social which is lacking in the theories of meaning making. Vygotsky (1966) 
explains:  
Perezhivanie (personal mental-emotional experience) is a unit of consciousness in 
which, on the one hand, the reality is represented in an indissoluble form, it refers to 
something outside a child; on the other hand, it represents how one experiences it, i.e. 
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all the features of a personality and all the features of the environment are represented 
in a personal mental-emotional experience. … Thus, in a personal mental-emotional 
experience we always deal with the indivisible unity of the personality characteristics 
and the peculiarities of the situation represented in this particular personal mental-
emotional experience. (pp.79-80) 
From this angle, a personality of a child is shaped by dynamic contacts with the environment 
in the course of social relations resulting in personal mental-emotional experiences. According 
to Vygotsky (1991), “…a personality… must be understood not as a final formation, but as a 
constantly changing dynamic form of interaction between an organism and environment” 
(p.241). He clarifies: “personality is a social concept…it is not in-born but arises as a result of 
cultural development” (Vygotsky, 1929/1982a, p.161) and “alongside with mental functions” 
(Vygotsky, 1986, p.59). From this it seems to follow that Vygotsky means that meaning making 
is an individualized process, unique for every person. Individual meanings are personified 
because of an individual’s axiological system, cultural erudition originating from one’s family, 
temperament, and emotional involvement. ‘Perezhivanie’ shapes a child’s personality and 
paves the way to the development of individualized modes of meaning making. Therefore, I 
have chosen to add the word ‘personal’, when translating the term ‘perezhivanie’. 
To summarize, it is reasonable to argue that Vygotsky deduces three important components 
contributing to child’s successful meaning making: maturing of mental functions and formation 
of conceptual systems (the cognitive), socially meaningful activity and acquiring cultural 
instruments (the social)10  and mental-emotional involvement into a personally meaningful 
situation (the volitional-emotional/motivational). All the three spheres are strongly 
interconnected and at times overlap.  
  
                                                 
10 According to Vygotsky (1993a), “in a general sense, all cultural is social” (p.145). 
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Chapter 4. Cognitivist view on meaning making  
 
This chapter explores how Vygotsky’s idea about emergence of complex and conceptual 
thinking can be realized in the light of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphorical thinking. 
Moreover, I will analyze how Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of cognitive metaphor supports 
Vygotsky’s conclusion that meaning making occurs according to some lines of generalization, 
sustaining the idea that human mind is a pattern-recognizer and a pattern-builder.  
First, I will describe Lakoff’ and Johnson’s approach to understanding of the metaphorical 
nature of human thinking. Then, I will analyze Lakoff and Johnson’s grasp of metaphor as a 
tool and a product of thinking and language, enabling storage of conventional meanings and 
providing tracks or lines of generalization for making new meanings. Finally, I will discuss the 
pedagogical potential of metaphor. 
There is no direct reference in Lakoff and Johnson’s works to Vygotsky’s theory, however, it 
is rather clear that they point to the same phenomena and follow similar methodological paths. 
Nevertheless, “it is probably more important… that many of the research trends that started 
more or less independently of Vygotsky’s theoretical legacy are now converging with his ideas” 
(Kozulin, 2012, p. xii). From this point of view, Vygotsky’s thoughts and ideas, “instead of 
fading with time, are becoming more and more prominent in the new contexts” (Kozulin, 2012, 
p. xii). 
4.1. Metaphorical nature of human thinking 
Vygotsky’s research has clearly shown that child’s thinking is not conceptual at the outset. A 
child does not think in terms of concepts but rather in terms of complexes and pseudo-concepts. 
However, primitive thinking does not preclude categorization in the process of cognition 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.150). To this end, Vygotsky draws attention to Lévy-Bruhl’s research 
of primitive thinking based on the principle of ‘participation’ (in Rssian: партиципация, 
participacija) which is in fact a primitive basic form of categorization (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, 
p.150). Vygotsky (1934/2012) explains: 
This is a relation which a primitive thought establishes between two objects or two 
phenomena, regarding them as partly identical, having a strong influence on one 
another, while there is no special contact between them, or any clear reasonable 
connection. (p.150) 
Even though ‘participation’ was studied by a number of scholars-contemporaries of Vygotsky, 
inter alia by Piaget with regard to child’s thinking, this phenomenon “was not studied properly”, 
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in Vygotsky’s opinion (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.151). The reason for that was that researchers 
examined the final result of this phenomenon, “ignoring those functions, forms of thought, 
cognitive operations, which establish these connections” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.151). 
Vygotsky is convinced that complex thinking of a child is based on ‘participation’ because 
“there arise connections and relations between objects in child’s thinking not explainable in 
terms of conceptual thinking” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.152). Further, Vygotsky observes that 
due to ‘participation’ “one and the same object can enter different complexes and thus can get 
different names” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.152). The use of a word as a family name in different 
complexes allows interrelations between complexes and then concepts (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, 
pp.152-153). Stating this in an axiomatic way, Vygotsky does not explain how these principles 
function in developing conceptual thinking.  
What Vygotsky drew attention to was in fact an attempt to explain how humans cognize 
phenomena in terms of other phenomena or objects. Since he recognizes this principle of 
thinking as basic, its significance is impossible to overestimate. The ‘participation’-principle 
gives the key to understanding of the nature of human conceptualization of the outer world and, 
thus, provides  the basis for understanding of the meaning making processes. Lakoff and 
Johnson’s idea of metaphorical nature of human thinking discloses, reveals and explains in 
detail how this principle works in human mind. To this end, Lakoff and Johnson’s research is 
the way to realize the meaning generation mechanisms outlined by Vygotsky. 
The main idea relating Vygotsky’s ‘participation principle’ and Lakoff and Johnson’s 
metaphorical thinking is that the essence of both is “understanding and experiencing one kind 
of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.5). This way of meaning making 
Lakoff and Johnson call ‘a cognitive metaphor’. This idea, in fact, goes back to Stephen C. 
Pepper’s root metaphor (Pepper, 1942), which he defined as “an area of empirical observation 
which is the point of origin for a world hypothesis” (p.38).11  
Lakoff and Johnson take the view that “our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get 
around in the world, and how we relate to other people” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p.454), i.e. 
“our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2003, p.3). They assert that “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we 
both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.3), 
                                                 
11 Cf. also McCormack’s definition of a cognitive metaphor: “the most basic assumption about the nature 
of the world or experience that we can make when we try to give a description of it” (McCormack, 1976). 
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thus “the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter 
of metaphor” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.3). 
In the same way as Vygotsky, Lakoff and Johnson claim that meaning making occurs through 
collaboration of thinking and language, stating in particular “metaphor as a phenomenon 
presupposes conceptual transference and a linguistic expression” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 
pp.61-62). They clarify that metaphors are not merely words, they are cognitive mechanisms 
intrinsic to our thinking, language and speaking (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003).  
According to Vygotsky, early concepts arise spontaneously in everyday (domestic) relations 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.123). Lakoff and Johnson call them primary metaphors based on 
experiential gestalts (more on gestalts in 4.2.). They explain that children “acquire a large 
system of primary metaphors automatically and unconsciously by functioning in the most 
ordinary of ways in the everyday world from … earliest years” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.47). 
This becomes possible because children and adults share conventionalized meanings of words, 
despite the fact that for children they are situational (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.116). Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) specify that  
Primary metaphors are like atoms that can be put together to form molecules. A great 
many of these complex molecular metaphors are stable – conventionalized, 
entrenched, fixed for long periods of time. They form a huge part of conceptual system 
and affect how we can think and what we can care about almost every waking moment. 
(p.60) 
Vygotsky observes that “in the first stage of child’s autonomous speech, there does not exist 
relations of generality between concepts, there are possible only connections established on the 
basis of perception” (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.271), then the question arises what mechanisms 
ensure the cohesion of concepts already in early age (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.271).  Concepts 
are not connected by associations, not through the structures of the perceived images, but due 
to their juxtaposition (comparison and differentiation) which results in a creation of an over-
concept bound by image (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, pp.271-272). 
These over-concepts are metaphorical types of generality, which Lakoff and Johnson described 
in terms of orientational, ontological and structural metaphors (Lakoff &Johnson, 1980a: 195-
198). Orientational metaphors are based on spatial orientations of our bodies’ functioning in 
the physical environment (p.196). Therefore, our spirits rise (SOMETHING is UP) and prices 
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fall (SOMETHING is DOWN).12 Ontological metaphors allow understanding our experience 
in terms of objects and substances, i.e. “human purposes typically require us to impose artificial 
boundaries that make physical phenomena discreet just as we are: entities bounded by a 
surface” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.25). Therefore, sometimes it is difficult to put one’s ideas 
in words (WORDS are CONTAINERS) or we run out of energy (VITAILITY is 
SUBSTANCE). Ontological metaphors like this are so natural and so pervasive in our thought 
that they are usually taken as self-evident, direct descriptions of mental phenomena (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2003, p.28). Structural metaphors involve structuring of one kind of experience in 
terms of another kind of experience or activity (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a, p.197). Therefore, 
we see each other’s points of view (SEEING is UNDESTANDING) and defend our positions 
(ARGUMENT is WAR).  
These over-concepts tune the whole conceptual system serving two purposes. On the one hand, 
they are storages for social-cultural human experience, on the other hand, they secure coherent 
structuring of new experiences and provide for continuity of meaning making (Melenteva, 
2001).    
4.2. Cognitive metaphors as storage systems and meaning making instruments 
Cognitive metaphors are repositories of social-cultural heritage of a linguo-cultural community 
(c.f. Bruner’s folk psychologies). They are the result of cognitive-practical-axiological-
emotional experience of linguo-cultural societies (Melenteva, 2001). This result is experienced 
by members of a linguo-cultural community as “a gestalt; that is, the complex of properties 
occurring together” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.71). People classify their experiences in terms 
of ‘experiential gestalts’ in the conceptual system (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.83). Gestalts 
should be understood as concepts whose properties “do not merely form a set but a structured 
gestalt, with dimensions that emerge naturally from our experience” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, 
p.122). Moreover, “concepts are defined by prototypes and by types of relations to prototypes” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.127). It seems that the coincidence of the prototypical features of 
gestalts gives the opportunity for a metaphorical shift, and they are those generalization lines, 
Vygotsky refers to, given in adult speech and setting the direction of development of gestalts 
in child’s thinking (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.140). 
Child’s thinking, guided by meanings established in the language of adults, undergoes universal 
developmental stages (the development of mental functions). However, language as a 
                                                 
12 More on that in Melenteva, 2001. 
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repository of cultural values of child’s lingo-cultural community, “predetermines the ways 
according to which child’s generalizations (cf. Lakoff’s prototypical gestalts) are shaped” 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.141). Lakoff and Johnson (2003) confirm that “the most fundamental 
values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental 
concepts in the culture” (p.22). Adults cannot pass on their modes of thinking to children, but 
they pass on the ready-formed meanings (values – MM) through their language (Vygotsky, 
1934/2012, p.141), thus providing the framework for social reality and cultural development of 
a child. Vygotsky does not specify how it happens, and here Lakoff and Johnson’s theory 
acquires an explanatory force. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) clarify: 
Each culture must provide a more or less successful way of dealing with its 
environment, both adapting to it and changing it. Moreover, each culture must define 
a social reality within which people have roles that make sense to them and in terms 
of which they can function socially. Not surprisingly, the social reality defined by a 
culture affects its conception of physical reality. What is real for an individual as a 
member of a culture is a product both of his social reality and of the way in which it 
shapes his experience of the physical world. Since much of our social reality is 
understood in metaphorical terms, and since our conception of the physical world is 
partly metaphorical, metaphor plays a very significant role in determining what is real 
for us. (p.146) 
As a result, child’s cognitive flexibility makes it possible, on the one hand, to inherit the system 
of metaphorical over-concepts typical of this culture and society and, on the other hand, to 
modify them to satisfy their personal requirements stemming from the volitional-emotional 
sphere. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) observe:  
 But we also have considerable cognitive flexibility, which provides for a limited but 
crucial freedom of conceptualization. Because we have multiple metaphors for our 
most important concepts, those metaphors can sometimes be reprioritized. It may be 
possible to learn to use certain metaphor rather than others and to learn new 
metaphors. Occasionally we become aware of some of our metaphors and their 
connections to each other, which may generate new ways of understanding. (p.537) 
Once internalized, cognitive metaphors serve as instruments of mapping and categorizing of 
the outer reality (Lakoff 1987) and models for constructing new meanings and new realities, 
especially social realities (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.156). Thus, cognitive metaphors may be 
guiding for future actions. In its turn, the power of the metaphor will be reinforced, and all 
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experiences become coherent. In this sense, “metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.156). The power of metaphor to create a new reality inspires its 
application in pedagogical contexts.  
4.3. Pedagogical potential of metaphor 
The significance of metaphors in instructional settings is recognized (Schultz & Lien, 2013), 
however their therapeutic or pedagogical potential has not yet been substantially studied. 
The first important pedagogical outcome of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory consists in the 
statement that “… we act according to the way we conceive of things” (Lakoff & Johnson, 
2003, p.5), i.e. we think, speak and act in very much the same terms (cf. Vygotsky’s inner 
speech). In case there arise worries about a child’s challenges in learning or social functioning, 
or about the way he or she acts in everyday life, there is a clear signal that pedagogical work 
with regard to meaning making needs to be done. How can we get access to child’s conceptual 
systems? Lakoff and Johnson come with an answer: “since communication is based on the same 
conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of 
evidence for what that system is like” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.3). 
Metaphorical thinking pervades child’s everyday reality. Therefore, “we can use metaphorical 
linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding 
of the metaphorical nature of our activities” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.7). It is important to 
note here, that Lakoff and Johnson do not mean that poetic metaphorical expressions or figures 
of speech creating poetic images give us access to child’s way of thinking, they are rather trite 
metaphors that define our actions. However, a picturesque image can certainly contribute to an 
effective meaning making. For example, when comparing a child’s outburst of anger to ‘a 
boiling pot’, we give a child a picture or an image of how it looks when he/she acts in this way. 
We provide a child with a metaphorical frame to help him or her make meaning of a situation. 
The picturesque image, however, does not violate the established over-concepts (in Vygotsky’s 
terms)/cognitive metaphors EMOTIONS are SUBSTANCES and HUMAN BODIES are 
CONTAINERS (like, for example: I am brimming with happiness, he is filled with joy). 
Therefore, it goes in line with previous metaphorical experiences of a child.  
Lakoff and Johnson (2003) argue that “when we say that a concept is structured by a metaphor, 
we mean that it is partially structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not others” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.13).  Let me suggest an example. The Western European society 
has accepted the cognitive metaphor of war with respect to discussions and argument. Thus, 
43 
 
ARGUMENT is WAR metaphor has become basis for the formation of usual metaphorical 
expressions like: Your claims are indefensible. He attacked every weak point in my argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. I demolished his argument. I’ve never won an argument 
with him. You must defend your position etc (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003).  
ARGUMNENT is WAR metaphor is not a fertile soil for those children who have socialization 
or behaviour problems or diagnoses like ADHD13, ASD14, ODD15 etc. It is difficult for them to 
recognize these expressions as metaphorical or figurative. ARGUMENT-slot can easily be 
substituted by, for example, COMMUNICATION-slot. This is possible because categories are 
open-ended and may lead to a recategorization (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.124). Then, the 
scope of situations interpreted in terms of war can expand. Since, this over-concept is well-
established as a linguo-cultural gestalt, children can easily apply COMMUNICATION is WAR 
scenario to a variety of situations.16 It must be mentioned, that “though categories are open-
ended, categorization is not random, since both metaphors and hedges define (or redefine) 
categories in systematic ways” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.124). Therefore, metaphorical shift 
is predictable and occurs within the domains meaningfully connected to each other.  Argument, 
conversation, social intercourse etc. have prototypical features which makes them open-ended 
to each other. War, fight, battle, combat, match, wrestling, taekwondo sparring etc also have 
open-ended edges.  
Due to its potential to re-categorize and create new understandings, metaphor can become 
useful in pedagogical settings. The change in slots in cognitive metaphors opens up for new 
interpretations and results in meaning making adequate for pedagogical purposes. Lakoff and 
Johnson (2003) emphasize: “in allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept …, a 
metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are 
inconsistent with that metaphor” (p.12). If, for example, a boy with ADHD repeats constantly 
that “the world (family, school, street) is a fight, a struggle, a battle –field” and acts accordingly 
because the cognitive metaphor dictates scenario for his actions, a careful introduction of new 
slots into his ‘cognitive metaphor of war’ may change his appreciation of both new and familiar 
situations. Judging by experience, the boy with ADHD reacted well to the modification of the 
basic metaphor COMMUNICATION is FIGHT into “fight is a football match”, then 
                                                 
13 Attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder 
14 Autism spectrum disorder 
15 Oppositional defiant disorder 
16 I have studied the meta-metaphorical level allowing the change of slots in Melenteva, 2001. 
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correspondingly COMMUNICATION is GAME,  with rules and respect to all players.17 Thus, 
disclosing deviations in the established systems of over-concepts (primary metaphors based on 
experiential gestalts) through speaking with a child and the analysis of his or her acting 
according to the establishing metaphorical pattern, can provide a necessary basis for 
pedagogical corrections.  
Another example illustrates the application of cognitive metaphor in a PTSD18 case. A girl 
suffering from PTSD failed to identify herself and her place in the group of children who were 
involved into a traumatic event. She constructed all her narratives based on metaphorical 
images associated with herself (her personal mental-emotional experiences). She spoke about 
herself as a sandbox, where kids played taking all the sand out of her (a personal mental-
emotional imprint). Therefore, she explained, she was empty inside all the time. The cognitive 
metaphor HUMAN is CONTAINER was sustained and then the slot SANDBOX was changed 
into WELL, which is never empty even if people take water out of it. Another example, is that 
she associated herself with a small miserable dog/cat seeking attention and nobody paid 
attention to her and “just kicked her around” (a personal mental-emotional imprint). She was 
suggested an image of a bigger dog/other animal, proud and all-sufficient. She chose an image 
of a panther (bigger cat) which led to the raise of her self-esteem. In both situations, the outcome 
was a shift in meaning making through the change in personal mental-emotional experience 
resulting in positive changes in the girl’s life. 
Metaphors are used in psychoeducation. According to Kvilhaug,19 it is important to give a child 
an opportunity to describe his or her own experience about what happens with the body (how 
it feels like having a diagnosis), because “language is an important source of evidence for what 
a conceptual system is like” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.3). Here are some of the expressions 
showing how it is perceived by a child to have ADHD or TS20, all of them are metaphoric:  
Det klør i hjernen min. Det er som myggestikk. Mitt skjelett passer ikke. Hjernen sender beskjed 
om å gjøre det. Hjertet brenner og hjernen fryser til is. Det danser rundt i hodet. Øynene styrer 
hit og dit når jeg retter oppmerksomhet til stedet. Jeg har varme bølger. Alle tankene mine 
popper opp som popcorn, de flytter hit og dit og jeg får ikke samlet dem (Kvilhaug, 2011). 
                                                 
17 The results of my experimental pedagogical interventions have not become the object of research yet. 
18 Post traumatic stress disorder 
19 My observations of the counselling process by Kvilhaug during my internship at Statped- Nord in spring 2017 
20 Tourette syndrome 
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These examples demonstrate that new, strange and unknown feelings are easier to describe in 
metaphoric terms, because metaphor helps to describe unknown in terms of known, and anchor 
it with a concrete image, based on one’s personal mental-emotional experience. 
Another important idea stems from the examples above. Children with developmental 
peculiarities (Vygotsky’s term) or children with special needs (accustomed term) can generalize 
experience according to different generalization lines, i.e. they can choose a different set of 
prototypical features of gestalts to make meaning of a new situation or phenomena. Like in the 
famous example, provided by Lakoff and Johnson about an Iranian student’s misunderstanding 
of a chemical metaphor. The example concerns the use of a metaphorical expression ‘the 
solution of my problems’. The student interpreted this metaphor as “a view of problems as 
things that never disappear utterly and that cannot be solved once and for all” because problems 
are chemical stuffs that can crystallize again and again in a chemical solution of a life situation 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 2003, p.144).  
The choice of different lines of generalization can preclude understanding of metaphorical 
expressions and result in literal interpretation. I recollect an example from my practice with a 
girl with ASD in a situation when she was confused because I said with regard to some others: 
“it is difficult to pull oneself together” (det er vel vanskelig å ta seg sammen). She put her hands 
around herself and tried to press them hard around her shoulders. Her conclusion was that it 
was impossible to pull oneself together. This example demonstrates that application of 
metaphor is not always productive with children who have autism, for example. For them, 
metaphor is confusing because of the linear syntagmatic character of their thinking. In such 
cases narrative can be more productive and I will discuss it in subsection 5.5.  
In conclusion, Vygotsky’s research on emergence of complex thinking based on the principle 
of ‘participation’, allowing conceptual shift along certain lines of generalization, in young age 
and development of conceptual thinking in adolescence converges with Lakoff and Johnson’s 
theory of metaphorical nature of human thinking. Moreover, the latters’ research reveals the 
essence of meaning making processes intrinsic to metaphorical thinking. The pedagogical 
potential of metaphor is based on its ability to catch and limit the understanding of the unknown 
or abstract and narrow the “freedom of conceptualization”; on the other hand, metaphors can 




Chapter 5. Social constructivist view on meaning making  
 
This chapter explores how Vygotsky’s idea of child cultural (social) development converges 
with Bruner’s theory of folk psychology and pre-linguistic readiness for meaning. Moreover, I 
will analyze how Bruner’s ‘narrative’ can operationalize Vygotsky’s ideas on social 
construction of meaning through personal mental-emotional experience and imitative 
modelling.  
First, I will describe Bruner’s approach to different types of thinking and the significance of 
folk psychology and pre-linguistic mental representations for humans’ construction of meaning. 
Then, I will analyze Bruner’s grasp of narrative as a storage device of folk theories and its 
generative capacity in meaning making. Finally, I will discuss the pedagogical potential of 
narrative. 
5.1. Vygotsky’s impact on Bruner’s research 
Bruner’s fundamental idea about social interactionist theory of language development stems 
from Vygotsky’s instrumentalism and imitative modelling with its socio-cultural impact on 
child’s cognitive and linguistic development. Bruner (1986) writes:  
For Vygotsky was plainly a genius…To begin with, I liked his instrumentalism, his 
way of interpreting thought and speech as instruments for the planning and carrying 
out of action. … Language is (in Vygotsky’s sense as in Dewey’s) a way of sorting 
out one’s thoughts about things. Thought is a mode of organizing perception and 
action. But all of them, each in their way, also reflect the tools and aids available in 
the culture for use in carrying out action. (p.72) 
The difference between their approaches is that Bruner is rather interested in social and 
interpersonal factors impacting on child’s meaning making, while Vygotsky is preoccupied 
with the process of transformation of interpersonal meaning making into intrapersonal, the latter 
encompassing emotional and neurobiological peculiarities of child’s personality. Still, Bruner 
(1986) recognizes Vygotsky’s rightness about the importance of both the cultural (social) and 
the biological in child’s development:  
Looking at his work again after many years of inspiration from it, I think he provides 
the still needed provocation to find a way of understanding man as a product of culture 
as well as a product of nature. (p.78) 
This is a crucial idea against which Bruner’s discussion of biological and cultural in meaning 
is built. They are the two driving forces in child development and Bruner’s research is an 
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attempt to reconcile the two approaches to meaning – cognitive and social constructivist – in a 
very Vygotskian way.  
5.2.  Syntagmatic and paradigmatic thinking 
Vygotsky’s idea of the principal role of child’s verbal thinking found its further elaboration in 
Bruner’s theory. Approaching this issue, Bruner observes that traditionally thought is treated 
as an instrument of reason, however not all modes of thought are logical (Bruner, 2004, p.691). 
According to Bruner, there are two modes of thinking: syntagmatic and paradigmatic. 
Syntagmatic thinking is associated with linear timing of the reality describing the sequence of 
events. Our everyday thinking is syntagmatic by its nature. This thinking includes a subjective 
perspective upon the reality and is situationally conditioned. Narrative is the structural unit of 
such a mode of thinking. Syntagmatic thinking exists parallel to paradigmatic thinking. The 
latter is not linear, rather often abstract. Bruner (1986) explains: 
There are two modes of cognitive thinking, two modes of thought, each providing 
distinct ways of ordering experience, or constructing reality. The two (though 
complementary) are irreducible to one another. Efforts to reduce one mode to the other 
or to ignore one at the expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich diversity 
of thought. Each of the ways of knowing, moreover, has operating principles of its 
own and its own criteria of well-formedness. They differ radically in their procedures 
for verification. A good story and a well-formed argument are different natural kinds. 
Both mentally different: arguments convince one of their truth, stories of their 
lifelikeliness. The other establishes not truth but verisimilitude. (p.11) 
Already in early childhood, syntagmatic way of thinking becomes part of an everyday life 
scenario. When commenting on the sequence of the performed actions, plans for a day or telling 
stories, adults trigger linear thinking in infants and children. It reminds us of Vygotsky’s idea 
of child’s complex thinking, the units of which are complexes of different designation but still 
built on the principle of linear lines of generalization (for example, generalization of the 
connection between perceived objects in one and the same setting, family resemblance etc). 
Complex thinking seems to precede syntagmatic thinking, because the latter operates with 
concepts not complexes. But they seem to overlap for a certain period in child’s development 
(Vygotsky 1934/2012, p.145). The discourses provided by adults result in the rise of 
spontaneous everyday concepts (in Vygotsky’s terms), which contributes to the formation of 
syntagmatic thinking.  
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Unlike Vygotsky, interested in the nature of concept formation, Bruner’s research interest is on 
the precursors of language in child. On the basis of his experiment, Bruner (1986) maintains 
that  
very young children had something clearly in mind about what others had in mind, 
and organized their actions accordingly. I thought of it as the child achieving mastery 
of one of the precursors of language use: a sense of mutuality in action. (p.59) 
Bruner regards this child’s ability to manage his or her attention jointly with others as the 
prerequisite of linguistic reference (Bruner, 1986, p.60). His experiments show that already by 
their first birthday children are capable of following others’ line of regard to search for an object 
attracting others’ attention, which “surely requires a sophisticated conception of a partner’s 
mind” (Bruner, 1986, p.60). Vygotsky calls this ability interpersonal perception (Vygotsky, 
1982, pp.379-380) and recognizes its significance for child’s language development. Vygotsky 
regards this stage as a pre-intellectual stage in speech development and considers it as a clear 
manifestation of the social function of language in early age (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.96). 
However, he does not develop this idea further and it is important for him only with regard to 
the discussion of egocentric-autistic vs. social organization of mind. Nevertheless, Vygotsky’s 
greatest achievement is that he realized that this stage is a stage of language development 
although infants are speechless. Bruner emphasizes this by saying “we (psychologists – MM) 
became interested (again in an individualistic way) in man’s specific innate readiness for 
language. But with a few exceptions, notably Vygotsky, we did not pursue the impact of 
language use on the nature of man as a species” (Bruner, 1990, p.11). 
 Vygotsky was very close to the conclusion, later made by Bruner (1986): 
The achievement by the child of such “intersubjective” reference comes so easily, so 
naturally, that it… suggests that there must be something preadapted and prelinguistic 
that aids us in achieving initial linguistic reference. I do not doubt such a biological 
assist. But this early assist is so partly in comparison to the finished achievement of 
reference that it cannot be the whole of the story.  … One has to conclude that the 
subtle and systematic basis upon which linguistic reference itself rests must reflect a 
natural organization of mind, one into which we grow through experience rather than 
one we achieve by learning. (p.63) 
From the above said it follows that the social organization of mind is a cognitive precursor of 
successful language development and thus verbal thinking. Through our cultural experience 
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mediated by life narratives we grow into such an organization of mind which allows us thinking 
both syntagmatically and paradigmatically, i.e. allows us operating both with everyday 
(spontaneous) and academic concepts (in Vygotsky’s terms). Cultural experience results in a 
number of cultural tool-kits (cultural instruments in Vygotsky’s terms) – “a stock of canonical 
life narratives with combinable formal constituents from which the members can construct their 
own life narratives” (Bruner, 2004, p.694). As I understand it, it is a kind of narrative 
competence presupposing one’s knowledge of myths, social rules and codes, cultural cognitive 
metaphors, cultural traditions, fairy tales etc and enabling an individual to understand and 
interpret social-cultural contexts. All in all, an individual’s narrative competence is based on 
folk psychology which I will discuss in the next subsection. Having said this, I will turn to 
paradigmatic thinking.  
Paradigmatic thinking is a “logico-scientific one, attempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, 
mathematical system of description and explanation” (Bruner, 1986, p.12). Paradigmatic 
thinking “employs categorization or conceptualization and the operations by which categories 
are established, instantiated, idealized, and related one to the other to form a system” (Bruner, 
1985, p.12). It will probably be wrong to conclude from this that syntagmatic thinking is void 
of categorization. Both syntagmatic and paradigmatic thinking employ categorization, but in 
case of syntagmatic thinking, categorization is contextually bound, while in paradigmatic 
thinking it becomes abstract.  In fact, Vygotsky also distinguishes between two types of 
thinking: visual-figurative and abstract (Vygotsky, 1934/2012, p.146), where the latter one is 
logical academic thinking, corresponding to Bruner’s paradigmatic thinking. As I understand 
Bruner’s line of argument, paradigmatic thinking gives an individual a meta-perspective which 
allows to open up for argument rather than justification. If a child does not develop 
paradigmatic thinking, fewer versions or interpretations of reality will be accessible, thus, a 
child may acquire a passive role in his/her own life. To this end, metaphor can become a 
valuable tool extending the repertoire of possible interpretations and meaning (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2003, p.3), and appearance of cognitive metaphors precedes systemic conceptual 
(paradigmatic in Bruner’s terms) thinking (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.124, p.156). Metaphors 
allow interpreting the new in terms of the known, thus metaphorical thinking allows acquiring 
another perspective on the phenomena and events, enriching folk theories with one’s own 
values and personal mental-emotional experiences. Vygotsky calls it figurative thinking 
(Vygotsky, 1934/2002, p.146).  
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To summarize, Vygotsky’s, Bruner’s and Lakoff and Johnson’s theories on thinking converge 
and complement each other. Vygotsky and Bruner distinguish pre-intellectual stage of joint 
reference in child’s language development.  Vygotsky singles out a level of complex thinking 
which corresponds to the stage in child development when he or she, according to Bruner, is 
engaged in the familiarization with cultural tool kits (narrative competence level). The next 
level is the level of syntagmatic thinking, in accordance with Bruner, which corresponds to 
Vygotsky’s stage of the appearance of spontaneous (everyday) concepts. This stage seems to 
coincide with figurative thinking (in Vygotsky’s terms) and metaphorical thinking (in Lakoff 
and Jonson’s terms). The highest level is the systemic level of highest abstraction and 
paradigmatic thinking distinguished also by all the scholars.  I have attempted to make a figure 
representing these levels in Appendix 1 and a figure representing the appearance of different 
operational units of thinking in Appendix 2. 
5.3. Folk psychology 
Syntagmatic thinking relies on folk theories constituting folk psychology. According to Bruner 
(1990),  
‘folk psychology’, ‘folk social science’ or ‘common sense’ is “a set of more or less 
connected, more or less normative descriptions about human being “tick”, what our 
own and other minds are like, what one can expect situated action to be like, what are 
possible modes of life, how one commits oneself to them… (p.35) 
Different terms are used to denote folk theories: cultural models, common sense theory, 
common knowledge, cultural myth, everyday theories, folk psychology etc (Skarstein, 2013, 
p.41). Interpreting Bruner, Skarstein explains “folk theories are everyday (contrary to scientific) 
theories about ‘the world’. They contain (unconsciously) assumptions about models of 
simplified worlds” (Skarstein, 2013, p.41). These everyday theories are organized into a system 
“by which people organize their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the 
social world” (Bruner, 1990, p.35).  
The major constituents of the folk psychology are “elementary beliefs or premises that enter 
into narratives about human plights” (Bruner, 1990, p.39). For Bruner, it is an obvious premise 
that people have beliefs and desires. People “believe that the world is organized in certain ways, 
that we want certain things, that some things matter more than others” (Bruner, 1990, p.39). 
People’s beliefs and desires are coherent and organized “as to merit being called 
“commitments” or “ways of life” and such coherences are seen as “dispositions” that 
characterize persons: loyal wife, devoted father, faithful friend” (Bruner, 1990, p.39). These 
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dispositions or commitments have a great power over human mental functioning and life 
because they provide “the very means by which culture shapes human beings to its 
requirements” (Bruner, 1990, p.15). Very early in life, when learning language children get 
acquainted with folk theories in order “to conduct the interpersonal transactions required in 
communal life” (Bruner, 1990, p.35). Acquiring them early and rightly opens up for a 
successful life scenario. I will come back to the discussion of this issue in section 5.5. when 
considering the pedagogical potential of a social narrative (social story/comic strip) for autistic 
children.  
So, Bruner (1990) argues that 
 …it is culture, not biology, that shapes human life and the human mind, that gives 
meaning to action by situating its underlying intentional states in an interpretative 
system. It does this by imposing the patterns inherent in the culture’s symbolic 
systems – its language and discourse modes, the forms of logical and narrative 
explication, and the patterns of mutually dependent communal life. (p.34) 
The substrate of folk psychology is culture. Bruner asserts that the turning point in human 
evolution was when culture became the crucial factor “in giving form to the minds of those 
living under its sway” (Bruner, 1990, p.12). Folk psychology “is a culture’s account of what 
makes human beings tick. It includes a theory of mind, one’s own and others’, a theory of 
motivation, and the rest” (Bruner, 1990, p.13). Psychology is immersed in culture and must be 
“organized around those meaning-making and meaning-using processes that connect man to 
culture” (Bruner, 1990, p.12). Thus, “the central concept of a human psychology is meaning 
and the processes and transactions involved in the construction of meanings” (Bruner, 1990, 
p.35). Bruner (1990) argues that “it is culture and the search for meaning that is the shaping 
hand, biology that is the constraint, and that… culture even has it in its power to loosen the 
constraint” (p.23).  
From that it seemingly follows that Bruner stands on the position of a sheer social 
constructivism, focusing on the significance of child’s social development, but it is not quite 
the point. In fact, he develops Vygotsky’s idea on the significance of the initial social function 
of speech and language preceding the appearance of egocentric private speech and inner speech. 
Bruner connects the “biology” of meaning to its “culture” (Bruner, 1990, p.69). From this point 
of view, his research is a valuable contribution to Vygotsky’s theory of the development of 
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mental functions, which completes the holistic picture of how thinking and language operate in 
meaning making.   
Bruner (1990) asks: “so how can there be a “biology” of meaning?” (p.69) and gives a 
comprehensive answer pointing out that one can conceive it “by reference to some sort of 
precursor system that readies the paralinguistic organism to traffic in language, some sort of 
protolinguistic system” (p.69). He concludes, quite like Vygotsky supposed, “we have an innate 
gift for language” (Bruner, 1990, p.69).  
Bruner calls this gift “a prelinguistic ‘readiness for meaning’” (Bruner, 1990, p.72). He explains 
that there exist certain classes of meaning “to which human beings are innately tuned and for 
which they actively search” (Bruner, 1990, p.72). These classes of meaning precede word 
meanings (in Vygotsky’s terms), they exist “in primitive form as protolinguistic representations 
of the world whose full realization depends upon the cultural tool of language” (Bruner, 1990, 
p.72). These protolinguistic representations remind us of the origin to Lakoff and Johnson’s 
cognitive metaphors – prototypic gestalts (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.71). In the same line of 
argument, Bruner (1990) maintains:  
 I believe it is highly malleable yet innate representation that is triggered by the acts 
and expressions of others and by certain basic social contexts in which human beings 
interact. In a word, we come initially equipped, if not with a “theory” of mind, then 
surely with a set of predispositions to construe the social world in a particular way and 
to act upon our construes. (p.73) 
So far, I have attempted to show Bruner’s core idea that folk psychology is rooted in a shared 
conceptual structure steeped in intentional states, like beliefs and commitments, originating 
from some kind of protolinguistic representations (Bruner, 1990, p.14, p.71). Cultural substrate 
of folk psychology inevitably makes it an axiological system because “it is through folk 
psychology that people anticipate and judge one another, draw conclusions about the 
worthwhileness of their lives, and so on” (Bruner, 1990, p.15). Bruner (1990) explains:  
when anybody is seen to believe or desire or act in a way that fails to take the state of 
the world into account, to commit a truly gratuitous act, he is judged to be folk-
psychologically insane unless he, as an agent, can be narratively reconstrued as being 
in the grip of a mitigating quandary or of crushing circumstances. (p. 40) 
This quotation contains an important idea: folk psychology is a cultural code of how things “are 
as they should be” (Bruner, 1990, p.40).  Bruner (1990) clarifies: “folk psychology is invested 
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in canonicality. It focuses upon the expectable and/or the usual in the human condition. It 
endows these with legitimacy or authority” (Bruner, 1990, p.47). When folk psychology’s 
“constituent beliefs are violated, then narratives are constructed” (Bruner, 1990, p.39).  It is 
narrative that “specializes in the forging of links between the exceptional and the ordinary” 
(Bruner, 1990, p.47).  
Narrativized folk psychology broadly “might be called the ‘organization of experience’” 
(Bruner, 1990, p.55) in terms of framing or schematizing (Bruner, 1990, p.56). Framing is 
extremely important because it  
provides a means of “constructing” a world, of characterizing its flow, of segmenting 
events within that world, and so on. If we were not able to do such framing, we would 
be lost in a murk of chaotic experience and probably would not have survived as a 
species in any case. (Bruner, 1990, p.56) 
The typical form of framing experience and individual’s memory of it is ‘narrative’ and I 
proceed with the examination of narrative in the next subsection.  
5.4. Narrative 
Bruner (1990) defines narrative as a form of discourse and a mode of organizing experience 
(p.43, p.55). Narratives are stories which render some information, and which create sense and 
give meaning to the discussed events. Narrative is a value loaded story about an individual’s 
experiences of events, it is a presentation of a situation structured according repertoire of folk 
theories, deep structures of folk psychology. Narratives vary from culture to culture, an 
individual to individual. Narrative is a type of discourse, possessing a meaning making potential 
(Skarstein, 2013, p.36). Also, narratives are frames, patterns or structures which help to arrange 
impressions, knowledge and experiences in a certain way. Bruner (2004) explains: 
…eventually the culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic processes that guide the 
self-telling of life narratives achieve the power to structure perceptual experience, to 
organize memory, to segment and purpose, build the very ‘events’ of a life. (p.692) 
Bruner (1990) distinguishes between the three elements of narrative: “its sequentially, its 
factual “indifference”, and its unique way of managing departures from the canonical” (p.50). 
Bruner (1990) specifies:  
Narrative requires…four crucial grammatical constituents if it is effectively to be 
carried out. It requires, first, a means for emphasizing human action or “agentivity” – 
action directed toward goals controlled by agents. It requires, secondly, that a 
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sequential order be established and maintained – that events and states be “linearized” 
in a standard way. Narrative, thirdly, also requires sensitivity to what is canonical and 
what violates canonicality in human interaction. Finally, narrative requires something 
approximating a narrator’s perspective: it cannot, in the jargon of narratology, be 
“voiceless”. (p.77) 
It means that narratives are created within a certain time-stream (for example, chronologically), 
in a cause-effect sequence, and are based on a plot (problematisation) rendered from an 
individual’s (agent’s) perspective. Furthermore, narratives can be based on facts or be 
imaginary without losing their meaning making power. Narratives are in a way imprints of 
reality which do not copy it but give it a new reading. Besides, narratives give meaning to 
exceptional behaviour, revealing an intentional state of a character which explains deviation 
from a canonical rule (Bruner, 1990, pp.44-50). By way of creating narratives encompassing 
these essential features, we involve ourselves into a cognitive process of arranging events and 
feelings in such a way that it makes sense for us (cf. Vygotsky’s personal mental-emotional 
experience).  
Bruner (2004) assigns significance to the stable structure of narrative saying that “…it is form 
rather than content that matters” (p.696). Moreover, these elements for Bruner, are of greatest 
importance for child’s language development. His argument, “admittedly a radical one, is 
simply that assures the high priority of these features in the program of language acquisition” 
(Bruner, 1990, p.79). He claims that the driving force for children’s acquiring language is “a 
“push” to construct narrative that determines the order of priority in which grammatical forms 
are mastered by the young child” (Bruner, 1990, p.77). 
The four requirements of narrative define the way for a child to master linguistic forms and 
categories in a certain order. Bruner (1990) explains that  
once young children come to grasp the basic idea of reference necessary for any 
language use …their principal linguistic interest centers on human action and its 
outcomes, particularly human interaction”. … People and their actions dominate the 
child’s interest and attention. This is the first requirement of narrative. (p.78) 
A second requirement “is early readiness to mark the unusual and to leave the usual unmarked” 
(Bruner, 1990, p.79), here he obviously means the theme-rheumatic structure of the sentence, 
shortened sentences, yes-no questions, the use of demonstratives, eventually articles etc. With 
reference to Roman Jakobson, Bruner maintains that “the very act of speaking is an act of 
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marking the unusual from the usual” (Bruner, 1990, p.79). The third requirement of narrative 
is “linearizing”, thus this urges a child to follow “the standardized maintenance of sequence … 
built into the structure of every known grammar” (Bruner, 1990, p.79). The fourth requirement 
of narrative is “voice or “perspective”” (Bruner, 1990, p.79), which is, as I understand it, a 
modality, a choice of genre etc. Bruner’s radical idea has in fact a didactic potential and can be 
applied in pedagogical contexts, for example, with children with language impairments of 
various kinds as a sequential structure for language training. 
Vygotsky’s theory of the development of mental functions and psychological systems 
impacting language development addresses the same issues, namely the driving force of stages 
in language acquisition. Bruner’s argument brings a cultural aspect into Vygotsky’s theory, 
very much in line with Vygotsky’s idea of the precedence of social function of the language to 
egocentric speech. Vygotsky does not connect these issues directly in one work but writes about 
these issues in different treatises. Bruner (1990) combines all these aspects in a laconic way, 
arguing that   
while we have an “innate” and primitive predisposition to narrative organization that 
allows us quickly and easily to comprehend and use it, the culture soon equips us with 
new powers of narration through its tool kit and through the traditions of telling and 
interpreting in which we soon come to participate. (p.80) 
An important aspect of narrative is its retrospective and selective character. Bruner (2004) puts 
it in the following way: “it is a selective achievement of memory recall” (p.693). Narrative is 
based on own experience, and the choice of what is recalled is always subjective. Besides, “self-
narrative is reflexive narrative, beyond verification and rationalization” (Bruner, 2004, p.693), 
because “stories have to do with how protagonists interpret things, what things mean to them” 
(Bruner, 1990, p.47). From this it follows that narrative is a personalized reflection on one’s 
experience. This aspect of narrative brings narrativized meaning making close to Vygotsky’s 
personal mental-emotional experience as a necessary component of meaning making. Bruner’s 
research shows that narrative is never objective and sometimes inconsistent: 
 …mind is never free of precommitment. There is no innocent eye, nor is there one 
that penetrates aboriginal reality. There are instead hypotheses, versions, expected 
scenarios. Our precommitment about the nature of a life is that it is a story, some 
narrative however incoherently put together. (Bruner, 2004, p.709) 
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Since meaning is personal, interpretation of all our acts as meaningful or meaningless depends 
on who constructs the meaning. In Bruner’s words: “to understand a man you must understand 
how his experiences and his acts are shaped by his intentional states” (Bruner, 1990, p.33). 
What a man is and what a man feels and thinks defines presentation of narrative because it is a 
narrator himself or herself who attaches meaning to narrative. Therefore, “conceptual Self” 
becomes central, “self as a concept created by reflection, a concept constructed much as we 
construct other concepts” (Bruner, 1990, p.100). Bruner (1990) observes, “Self, in this 
dispensation, becomes “dialogue dependent”, designed as much for the recipient of our 
discourse as for intrapsychic purposes” (p.101). This observation of Bruner is a clear connection 
to Vygotsky’s (and Bakhtin’s) idea of the social character of individual’s consciousness. 
Therefore, this is only natural that meaning is constructed in interactions with others, in a 
dialogue, even if this is a dialogue with one’s conceptual Self. That is what Vygotsky calls the 
inner speech. When telling stories from the point of view of one’s conceptual Self, one creates 
a reality with a “dual landscape”: a landscape of action and a fictional landscape, which “must 
be given a reality of its own” (Bruner, 1986, p.14, p.36). If Bruner is right and our reality is 
what we think about it and what we tell about it, then the potential of narrative is large. When 
helping children to shape stories of their life, we can substantially reduce stress, anxiety and 
traumatic stress. I will now turn to the discussion of a pedagogical potential of narrative. 
5.5. Pedagogical potential of narrative 
Acquisition of folk theories is no less important than acquisition of other knowledge, including 
educational or pedagogical setting. Moreover, folk theories precede acquisition of any 
knowledge, and even language. Therefore, it seems plausible to assert that pedagogy and special 
needs pedagogy must work with child’s world knowledge first. The reason for this is formulated 
by Bruner (1990) in a concise way: “in folk psychology, then, people are assumed to have world 
knowledge that takes the form of beliefs and are assumed to use that world knowledge in 
carrying out any program of desire or action”. 
Thus, folk psychology defines how children behave in social relations and how they resolve 
challenging situations in everyday activities. Since the world knowledge takes the form of 
beliefs, it becomes true and axiomatic, needing no argument in decision making. Children rely 
on folk theories (axioms) because they are stable and deviations from them are evident. If a 
deviation occurs, the meaning making process is triggered and a new narrative is composed. 
Children do not always need help in meaning making, but the pedagogues role is crucial in the 
zone of proximal development (in Vygotsky’s terms).  
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Bruner suggests that “the division between an “inner” world of experience and the “outer” one 
that is autonomous of experience creates three domains, each of which requires different form 
of interpretation” (Bruner, 1990, p.40). The inner world is the experience of which meaning is 
already made, it is stored in the conceptual system. The outer world is unknown and chaotic, 
but unavoidable to learn about and make meaning of. Bruner (1990) clarifies:  
The first is a domain under the control of our own intentional states: a domain where 
Self as agent operates with world knowledge and with desires that are expressed in a 
manner congruent with context and belief. The third class of events is produced “from 
outside” in a manner not under our own control. It is the domain of “nature”. In the 
first domain we are in some manner “responsible” for the course of events; in the third 
not. (p.41) 
The first domain, one’s inner world, is the domain of one’s conceptual Self. The understanding 
of one’s conceptual Self (agent, protagonist) is a key idea in psychoeducation. In applying 
psychoeducation in Statped’s practice, counsellors 21  start with learning about the child’s 
perspective, what the child means by doing particular things. They emphasize that it is 
important to make a child be aware that his/her actions are not meaningless, that everything 
he/she does makes sense for those around him/her. To achieve it, one must give a child an 
opportunity to talk about their and other’s behaviours. Children’s language reflects the inner 
state and gives a hint to how children understand their own peculiarities, i.e. how they make 
meaning of their place in the environment.  I have already given examples in subsection 4.3. 
how children with ADHD and TS describe their states in terms of metaphoric expressions. 
Kristensen (2014) calls it identity-understanding or identity-development 
(identitsforståelse/identitetsutvikling) (pp.28-29). In other words, it is important to map the 
‘conceptual Self zone’ in order to realize the borderline between the first domain and the second 
domain – the domain where a conceptual Self collaborates with others.   
Another important step in psychoeducational meaning making is to show a child that what 
he/she experiences is part of the syndrome but not part of his/her personality. Therefore, it is 
proposed to make a child realize that he/she has a diagnosis, provided he/she is supplied with 
information and explanations. For many to learn about their diagnosis is a relief, because they 
stop thinking that they are obsessed (Rønsholdt, Groot, Godrim, & Bech, 2013, p.26). It is true 
that talking about TS, for example, can reinforce tics and aggression. However, it is necessary 
                                                 




to do it but using a pragmatic “matter-of-fact” approach, as if talking generally and providing 
examples of how other children may behave and tic. Through this, a child realizes that there are 
other people who have these difficulties and a child accepts himself/herself. Moreover, a child 
understands that there are ways to handle TS, ADHD conditions etc. In Bruner’s terms, it can 
sound in the following way: together with a child we create a narrative justifying deviation in 
his or her behavior. The narrative refers to other people’s deviations similar to those of the child 
in question, thus making them canonical (‘normal’) for this particular diagnosis, and thus 
providing a basis for a child’s self-acceptance.  
No less important it is to help parents/teachers realize and be aware that they may make a wrong 
meaning of a child’s situation. In the case considered by Kvilhaug, the father rejects the idea 
that his children (with ADHD, TS, probably OCD22 or ODD) may be different from others. He 
says: Han gjør det for å oppnå noe. Han kan jo la være, det har vi sett. Det er nok noe han bare 
kan skru av og på når han ønsker det, vi hadde jo aldri tics hos oss i familie. He makes a totally 
different narrative: his child is naughty and spoiled, deviations in the child’s behavior do not 
meet canonical rules of good behavior.   
Statped’s counselors specify that if neither parents nor teachers at school see a child’s 
perspective, reject him/her having his/her neurobiological peculiarities, it may lead to more 
serious disruptive behaviours, aggression and anti-social behaviours. To make the situation 
manageable, the boy and his parents together with the school must make the same meaning of 
the situation, create a common narrative.  
To make the common meaning of the situation and create the narrative understandable by all 
participants of the deviating situation, we need an area where participants’ interests and needs 
can meet – the second domain, introduced by Bruner. This domain is “the second class of events 
that is problematic, comprising some indeterminate mix of the first and the third” (Bruner, 1990, 
p.41). That is what Vygotsky defined as the zone of proximal development. This is here that a 
child needs instruction and support in the form of imitative modelling: a set of interpretative 
techniques or a narrative, mitigating the effect of the unknown. Bruner (1990) specifies:  
Thus, while a culture must contain a set of forms, it must also contain a set of 
interpretative procedures for rendering departures from those norms meaningful in 
terms of established patterns of belief. It is narrative and narrative interpretation upon 
which folk psychology depends for achieving this kind of meaning. Stories achieve 
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their meanings by explicating deviation from the ordinary in a comprehensible form 
– by providing the “impossible logic”. (p.47) 
The impossible logic in the case mentioned above is the understanding of the fact that the 
child’s challenges are part of his diagnosis. Providing interpretation of the deviations, the 
counsellor makes the situation comprehensible for the child and his parents and teachers. The 
departures from the norms of social behaviour become meaningful because they signalize the 
challenges resulting from his diagnoses and from the lack of understanding by parents and 
teachers in the need of clear routines in his/her situation. When creating a new comprehensive 
and comprehensible narrative for a life situation, one does not only reduce frustrations but 
creates a new scenario for a life story.  
This is what Bruner calls the construing power of the narrative when he explains that narrative 
created in an individual situation acquires the function of organizing future experience (Bruner, 
2004, p.692). Bruner (2004) explains:         
Life stories are highly susceptible to cultural, interpersonal, and linguistic influences. 
This susceptibility to influence may, in fact, be the reason why ‘talking cures’, 
religious instruction, and other interventions in a life may often have such profound 
effects in changing a person’s life narrative. (p.692) 
This very idea about the profound effect of ‘talking-cures-narratives’ makes Bruner’s research 
topical for the discussion of the application of meaning making in special needs pedagogy, 
particularly in supporting children with PTSD or social-emotional challenges. The creation of 
narratives is often used as part of the trauma-releasing exercises. Both Hobfoll et al. and Ko et 
al. recommend inter alia to create new meanings of the trauma history and subsequent 
experiences (Hobfoll et al., 2007; Ko et al., 2008, p.398), i.e. to create new narratives of 
traumatic events. Bruner (2004) explains the effect of the construing power of narrative in the 
following way:  
 I believe that the ways of telling and the ways of conceptualizing that go with them 
(narratives- MM)  become so habitual that they finally become recipes for structuring 
experience itself, for laying down routes into memory, for not only guiding the life 
narrative up to the present but directing it into future” because “…life is not “how it 
was” but how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, told and retold. (p.708) 
Another aspect of the pedagogical potential of narrative is that due to its construing power, it 
provides the basis for imitative modelling, acting according to what the narrative-model 
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suggests. Bruner emphasizes: “saying and doing represent a functionally inseparable unit in a 
culturally oriented psychology” (Bruner, 1990, p.19). Thus, a famous principle ‘learning by 
doing’ should be reformulated to ‘learning by saying and doing’. This very idea we find in 
Vygotsky’s ‘inner speech’- theory and Lakoff and Johnson’s idea on metaphorical thinking and 
acting discussed in chapter 4 (subsection 4.2.). I cannot help mentioning Bruner’s reference to 
Henry James who formulated this idea so wisely: “stories happen to people who know how to 
tell them” (as quoted in Bruner, 2004, p.691). 
To make stories happen we need to create them. In practice with autistic children, one uses the 
so called ‘social stories’.23  Social stories are short narratives describing certain activities, 
situations or events. They include information on canonical rules of behaviour and explain what 
to expect from a situation. Social stories are used for different purposes: to establish and 
develop selfcare, social or academic skills (wash hands, say hello, library visit), to help to cope 
with new routines, behavioural strategy (when one is angry), to explain the behaviour of others 
etc. Social stories are based on the narrative structure presented by Bruner and include the four 
necessary components discussed in subsection 5.4. 
A variation of a social story is a comic strip conversation, the latter includes pictures and 
symbols, making a story more illustrative and easier to understand (Appendix 3). Judging by 
experience, the stories become part of private speech of a child first and then are internalized 
as inner speech. The meaning rendered by a social story becomes shared with all those around 
a child. That is what Bruner (1990) emphasizes as crucial for survival:  
Our culturally adapted way of life depends upon shared meanings and shared concepts 
and depends as well upon shared modes of discourse for negotiating differences in 
meaning and interpretation…The child does not enter the life of his or her group as a 
private and autistic sport of primary processes, but rather as a participant in a larger 
public process in which public meanings are negotiated. (p.13) 
Interestingly, internalization of the meaning rendered by a social story, is only then completed 
if it occurs through personal mental-emotional experience. It is not enough to make a child 
memorize the text, to make a child understand what happens when deviations from the 
canonical rule in the story occur. It is important to recollect here that imitative modelling 
presupposes re-creation of someone’s mode of behavior as one’s own. For an autistic child, a 
social story has nothing to do with him or her, thus re-creation as one’s own is not easy. If 
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deviation in child’s behavior occurs- a child rejects to act in accordance with the rule of a social 
story – the rule becomes part of his or her personal mental-emotional experience, and the story 
becomes meaningful. For example, the social story of ‘washing hands before eating’ was 
presented on beforehand and the consequences of its deviation were discussed, but it only then 
became meaningful when a child had to act according to the rule, despite his disgust to all 
liquids on his hands. Through this personal mental-emotional experience, a child realized the 
difference between canonical and deviating which gave a very positive result. Bruner (1990) 
explains that the crucial moment here is:  
the ability not only to mark what is culturally canonical but to account for deviations 
that can be incorporated in narrative. The achievement of this skill, …, is not simply 
a mental achievement, but an achievement of social practice that lends stability to the 
child’s social life. (p.68) 
To conclude, I have attempted to show in this section how work with the conceptual Self in 
psychoeducation can contribute to a better meaning making and help to define the limits of the 
zone of proximal development. I have also tried to illustrate how narratives can operationalize 
Vygotsky’s imitative modelling and personal mental-emotional experience when applying 
social stories with autistic children. The pedagogical potential of narratives could be larger than 
that. One can apply them in pedagogical practice with children who have behavioral problems 
(ODD; OCD), concentration challenges (ADHD), social-emotional difficulties (PTSD), 





Chapter 6. Summary and conclusions  
 
The master thesis has aimed at examination of the genesis of the theory of meaning making in 
Vygotsky’s pedagogical-psychological theory of child’s development and the analysis of the 
evolution of the meaning making theory within the cognitivist and the social constructivist 
approaches. It has also been questioned if this can provide a basis for a discussion of 
applicability of meaning making in special needs pedagogy. In order to achieve the objective, 
the following research questions have been posed:  
-to describe and discuss relevant pillar concepts regarding meaning making in Vygotsky’s 
holistic theory of child’s cognitive, linguistic and social-cultural development;  
- to analyse how Vygotsky’s original framework ideas can be understood and operationalized 
with the help of new research within the cognitivist and the social constructivist approaches to 
meaning making.  
- to clarify how these two approaches converge with Vygotsky’s ideas, how they contribute to 
the theory of meaning making and how new knowledge within them opens up for new 
perspectives in pedagogical contexts.  
This chapter aims at presenting the most important of my finding and conclusions which allows 
to arrive at the conclusion that special needs pedagogy has the capacity and potential for the 
application of meaning making to treating children with developmental peculiarities. The 
conclusions and findings are presented in three groups in correspondence with the research 
questions.  
 
Vygotsky’s framework ideas 
Vygotsky’s’ theory of child’s development is comprehensive and complex, I have scrutinized 
only those pillar concepts which have significance for child’s meaning making. In the course 
of reading and examination of Vygotsky’s theory, it has become possible to point out, describe 
and discuss a the following framework ideas: 
 
1. Understanding between people through verbal communication is possible because of the 
word meanings belonging both to the plane of thought and the plane of language. People 
construe the reality in a generalized way in their conceptual systems, and language actively 
participates in this meaning making process. 
2. Each stage in child’s development is characterized by its own combination of mental 
functions in cognitive (psychological) systems. When in-born mental functions acquire 
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voluntary and conscious character (i.e. become higher mental functions), meaning making 
in terms of everyday (spontaneous) and academic concepts becomes possible. The 
appearance of intellectual speech and verbal thinking are decisive for the establishment of 
child’s conceptual systems. 
3. Children do not perceive the world chaotically but in terms of certain patterns or categories. 
When perceiving objects or phenomena, children gradually start to categorize them with 
the help of words and, thus, make meaning of them. Children tend to ascribe meaning to 
senseless situations (pictures, events, circumstance etc) and, thus, memorize information 
when there appear a pattern/structure in this information. Children can either recognize or 
create a pattern to make information (situation) meaningful. Human minds are tuned to 
recognize and build patterns.  
4. A child is born equipped with a whole range of pre-linguistic cognitive tools aimed at social 
communication. A child’s first pre-intellectual speech and its later intellectual version is 
also socially oriented. When thinking becomes verbal, social speech turns to a child 
himself/herself and becomes private. Private (egocentric) speech plays a crucial role in 
child’s self-regulation and establishment of executive functions. Private speech does not die 
out, it becomes internalized, changes its form and becomes inner speech, part of verbal 
thinking and a means of self-guidance. Inner speech’s function is to connect the outer reality 
and the inner world of a person.  
5. The pre-stage in concept formation is the appearance of mental units of different 
designation, basically complexes. Child meaning making is situationally and specifically 
conditioned and it relies on generalizations of perceptions. Due to the lack of cognitive 
abilities to construe concepts, a child needs to rely on common sense and world knowledge. 
Meanings, a child makes, are similar to those of an adult, because a child internalizes 
cultural and cognitive tools already given in adults’ language. 
6. Everyday concepts appear spontaneously as a result of a conscious effort to form a concept 
when finding a solution for a socially meaningful task. Academic concepts arise as a result 
of a conscious effort to internalize a meaning of a given concept in an instructional setting. 
7. Socially meaningful activity allows children to extract cognitive and cultural tools from 
their society (instrumentalism). This is possible because of the imitative modelling which 
is internalization of the given model of behavior (way of thinking or meaning) and re-
creation of it as one’s own for the purposes of own use.  
8. Mental functions, conceptual systems, socially meaningful activity with adult participation 
within the zone of proximal development constitute the basis for successful meaning 
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making. Personal mental-emotional experiences pave the way to individualized meaning 
making. They are internal attitudes of a child to a moment of reality refracted through 
motivational sphere of a child; they determine how this particular moment will influence 
the course of the further development of a child. Thus, the importance of personal mental-
emotional experience for child’s meaning making must not be underestimated. 
 
Lakoff and Johnson’s and Bruner’s contribution 
In the course of analysis of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor and Bruner’s 
theory of folk psychology and narrative structuring of reality, it has become possible to realize 
how Vygotsky’s ideas can be understood and operationalized due to the explanatory potential 
of subsequent cognitive and social constructivist research.   
1. Vygotsky outlined the principle of ‘participation’ (партиципация) underlying the initial 
process of cognizing the world by children (primitive thinking in Vygotsky’s terms). 
Participation is understanding objects and phenomena in terms of other objects and 
phenomena due to which objects can enter different complexes (domains) and get different 
names. Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphorical thinking discloses, reveals and 
explains how the lines of generalization (Vygotsky does not explain their nature) operate in 
conceptual categorization of child’s experience in terms of ontological, orientational and 
structural metaphors.  
2. Vygotsky paid much attention to the explanation of the development of complex thinking 
which results in the appearance of everyday spontaneous concepts. He did not, however, 
explain substantially how spontaneous concepts arise. Lakoff and Johnson’s theory reveals 
the essence of this process. Primary metaphors based on experiential gestalts possess some 
prototypical features and are only partly structured, in fact they are open-ended. 
Prototypical features allow juxtaposition of concepts (domains) and open-ended edges of 
concepts allow metaphorical (conceptual) shift. Since the lines of metaphorizing are 
inherently built in the language and are based on the systems of cultural values of a linguo-
cultural society, a metaphorical shift remains within the established tracks of the basic 
cognitive metaphors. At the same time, open-ended character of cognitive metaphors opens 
up for ‘a new metaphorical reality’. Thus, on the one hand, metaphors contribute to 
stabilization of the meaning making process providing familiar lines of conceptualization 
of the unknown and abstract in terms of the known and concrete; on the other hand, they 
open up for new understanding of familiar situations or phenomena. 
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3. Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive metaphors seem to render the essence of Vygotsky’s 
instrumentalism. In their meaning making, when acquiring cultural and cognitive tools of 
their society, children rely on the meanings given in the speech of adults. Vygotsky’s over-
concepts or Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive metaphor are repositories of practical, social, 
cultural, axiological experience of the society. Via the use of linguistic (also trite 
metaphoric) expressions, adults provide knowledge of the social reality. Internalized 
cognitive metaphors are cognitive and cultural tools used by children further in mapping 
and categorizing new phenomena in personal (individual) meaning making. 
4. The idea of Vygotsky’s verbal thinking is further developed in Bruner’s research. Bruner’s 
syntagmatic linear thinking based on folk theories and narrative meaning making 
operationalizes Vygotsky’s ideas on a pattern-oriented mind of a child and imitative 
modelling as a basis of world comprehension and learning. Vygotsky emphasizes that 
child’s meaning making is situationally conditioned and relies on adults’ world knowledge 
and common sense in understanding of new situations. Bruner’s folk psychology discloses 
what adults’ world knowledge comprise. The substrate of folk psychology is culture and 
that is how Bruner connects culture (cultural instruments), mental processes (mental 
functions), learning (imitative modelling) and an individual’s narrative meaning making 
(personal mental-emotional experience). 
5. Vygotsky mentions in passing, but emphasizes its importance, the pre-intellectual stage in 
speech development of a child. Bruner manages to connect the biology and the culture of 
meaning. Bruner’s explanations of child’s prelinguistic readiness for meaning, the innate 
gift for language reveals Vygotsky’s theory of in-built mental functions, especially pre-
intellectual speech and pre-linguistic thinking. Besides, Bruner’s research reinforces 
Vygotsky’s conviction of the initial social character of language (Vygotsky’s most 
important argument in his polemic with Piaget).  
6. Vygotsky’s focus in all his research was on child’s consciousness, child’s inner world 
encompassing mental process, conceptual systems and voluntary-emotional (motivational) 
sphere. Bruner’s research of the importance of child’s conceptual Self and its role in 
narrative-building operationalizes Vygotsky’s unfinished idea on personal mental-
emotional experience of a child. Narrative contains a narrator’s perspective, reveals 
intentional state of a narrator, his explanation of the deviation from the canonical and 
defines what is important for a child’s future development. This is exactly what Vygotsky 
implied when introducing the significance of ‘perezhivanie’ (переживание). 
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Convergence of ideas and pedagogical potential of meaning making 
From the above-said it has already become clear that many of Vygotsky’s ideas on meaning 
making converge with Bruner’s and Lakoff and Johnson’s ideas. The most vivid convergence 
of them is their similar understanding of the processes involved in child meaning making: the 
strong interconnection of language, thinking and activity. Also, their comprehension of the 
evolvement of modes of thinking and their operational units is another example of such a 
convergence (see Appendices 1 and 2). It is also important to conclude how contributions from 
these approaches open up for the perspectives of the use of meaning making in pedagogical 
contexts, especially in special needs pedagogy: 
1. Lakoff and Johnson’s idea that our conceptual system defines our everyday reality is the 
cornerstone for application of metaphor in pedagogical context. Since communication is 
based on the conceptual system used by children in thinking, speaking and acting, language 
is an important source of information about child’s conceptual system and a tool with which 
we can impact its development. On the one hand, when interpreting child’s linguistic 
expressions (social or private speech), we can realize what his world vision on a certain 
situation is like. For children, especially in emotional situations, it is easier to describe 
unknown, strange or abstract feelings and thoughts in terms of concrete and known 
phenomena, anchoring them with an image from their personal mental-emotional 
experience. This can cause relief from mental chaos, and stability because of the 
materialized nomination.  On the other hand, due to metaphor’s potential to create new 
realities through changing slots in open-ended domains of the established cognitive 
metaphors, we can help to create a new understanding of a problematic situation. The 
illustrations used in the text show that metaphors can successfully apply in the situations 
when children experience behavioral, social and emotional challenges (AD/HD, TS, ODD, 
OCD, PTSD etc). However, due to the use of figurative lines of generalization in metaphors, 
they cannot probably be as effective in ASD or SLI. Still, equipped with the strategy to use 
metaphor with the purpose to catch and bind unknown experience to a concrete image (limit 
freedom of conceptualization) or/and also to widen and expand an understanding of a 
problematic event, a child becomes an active participant in his or her own meaning making. 
2. Due to its unique characteristic to justify departures from the canonical, narrative can 
become an important tool in special needs pedagogy. It allows to both learn the cultural and 
social codes, sustain identity-understanding or help in its formation, and cure challenging 
or traumatic experiences by way of explaining deviations from cultural commitments.  
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Narrative can be both a pattern for imitative modelling and a means of expressing personal 
mental-emotional experience. Narrative has already found its way into psychoeducation 
applied in special needs pedagogical practices and seems to be effectively implemented 
there. Besides, in the form of social stories and comic strip conversations it has become an 
effective strategy for children with autism.  
My findings and conclusions support the urge for “a shift in thinking away from regarding 
children as the passive victims of harmful experiences, towards perceiving them as social actors 
with their own views and strategies for actively coping with challenges in their lives” (Graham, 
Phelps, Maddison, & Fitsgerald, 2011, p.480). Assisting children in their meaning making, 
either applying cognitive metaphor or narrative, special needs pedagogues supply them with 
cognitive and cultural tools which children can internalize and use as their own, actively and 
independently in their future lives. To this end, more research, evidently empirical, on practical 
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Appendix 1: Modes of thinking at different age 
 
 
*It must be noted that borderlines between the areas are fuzzy. The areas overlap. For 
example, complex thinking based on the principle of participation gradually transforms into 

















































Meaning – an internal side of a sign, it belongs to the sphere of speech to the same extent as it 
belongs to the sphere of thought. It is thought created in a word, it is the path from a thought to 
a word. It is the internal structure of a sign operation.  
 
Meaning making – an extraordinary verbal act of thought, a unity of generalization and 
communion, communication and thinking. It is the process of categorizing phenomena of 
reality in a generalized way in the course of verbal communication between people. 
 
Mental function – a cognitive process of learning about and responding to the environment for 
the purpose of survival. It is an in-born mental ability (perception, memory, language and 
thinking etc.) which acquires voluntary and conscious character in the process of maturing. 
 
Verbal thinking – the unity of language and thinking that retains all the properties that belong 
to speech and thought as a single process. 
 
Private speech – speech of a child accompanying child’s actions, which mediates thinking in 
the course of practical activity. It is an important tool of self-guidance. It is also known as crib 
speech in later research.   
 
Inner speech – silent speech for oneself, a tool of self-regulation, an inner dialogue with one’s 
conceptual Self in the process of meaning making   
 
Everyday (spontaneous) concept – a result of child’s own experience in the outer world when 
a child comes across a socially meaningful task which is impossible to solve without a 
conscious effort to form a concept.  
 
Academic concept – a result of a child’s conscious effort to internalize a proposed concept in 
an instructional setting in the process of formal schooling. This effort begins with an 
understanding of a verbal definition of the given concept and implies a voluntary application 
of this concept. 
 
Instrumentalism – extraction and internalization by a child of the cognitive and cultural tools 
characteristic of their linguo-cultural society given in adult speech and language for the 
purposes of individual meaning making. 
 
Zone of proximal development – a sphere of a child’s potential abilities which develop 
through cooperation with an adult 
 
Podrazhanie (подражание, imitative modeling) – the content of the zone of proximal 
development which consists in the internalization of somebody else’s model of behaviour or 
meaning through the prism of personal mental-emotional experience (‘perezhivanie’ – in 
Vygotsky’s terms) and recreation of someone’s model of behaviour or meaningful life strategy 




Perezhivanie (переживание, personal mental-emotional experience) – an internal attitude 
of a child to a moment of reality refracted through his consciousness and determining how this 
moment will impact the course of the future development of a child. It implies both cognitive 
processing and emotional involvement and results in an individualized imprint of the moment 
in a child’s consciousness.    
 
Participacija (партиципация, participation) – the basic principle of categorization in 
primitive thinking allowing to cognize and experience objects and phenomena in terms of other 
objects and phenomena. 
 
 
Lakoff and Johnson’s terms 
 
Cognitive metaphor – a way of understanding and experiencing of the unknown or abstract in 
the outer reality in terms of concrete or known phenomena or objects. Cognitive metaphors are 
both instruments of mapping and cognizing the reality and repositories of social-cultural 
heritage of a linguo-cultural community. Due to cognitive metaphors our experience is 
conceptualized in the systems of structured gestalts possessing prototypical features. Open-
ended edges of conceptual domains allow a metaphorical shift and reconceptualization of 
experience. 
Primary metaphor – a basic cognitive metaphor acquired by a child automatically and 
unconsciously through adult speech. It is an atom-metaphor containing conventionalized 
meanings of reality. There are three types of such metaphors: orientational, ontological and 
structural metaphors. Orientational metaphors are based on spatial orientations of our bodies’ 
functioning in the physical environment (e.g. SOMETHING is UP). Ontological metaphors 
allow understanding our experience in terms of objects and substances (e.g. WORDS are 
CONTAINERS). Structural metaphors involve structuring of one kind of experience in terms 





Narrative – a form of discourse and a mode of organizing experience. It is a selective 
achievement of memory recall allowing justification of the departure from canonical rules. It 
provides a framework for understanding the past events of one’s life and for planning future 
actions. It is the primary scheme by means of which human existence is rendered meaningful. 
 
Syntagmatic thinking – a mode of thinking associated with linear timing of the reality 
describing the sequence of events. Our everyday thinking is syntagmatic by its nature. This 
thinking includes a subjective perspective upon the reality and is situationally conditioned.  
 
Paradigmatic thinking – a logico-scientific mode of thinking which attempts to fulfill the ideal 
of a formal, mathematical system of description and explanation. It employs categorization or 
conceptualization and the operations by which categories are established, instantiated, 
idealized, and related one to the other to form a system. 
 
Folk psychology/folk theory – a set of more or less connected normative canonical 
descriptions/dispositions about the outer world, what our own and other minds are like, believes 
and commitments. It is the world knowledge based on common sense.  
 
